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Leasehold Policy and Land Use Planning in Canberra: 
A Critical Assessment 
Steven C. Bourassa, Max Neutze & Ann Louise Strong 
Introduction 
Canberrans celebrated the 81st birthday of their city in March 1994, with a 
week-long festival. The scale of events was impressive: over 30 hot air 
balloons, including a giant birthday cake balloon from the United States, wafted 
overhead at dawn; 140 teams from many nations competed in dragon boat races 
on Lake Burley Griffin; over 100,000 people enjoyed the Wine and Food Festival 
in Commonwealth Paik; and a quarter million dollars' worth of fireworks lit the 
Canberra sky. 
Canberrans love their city and are proud of it In 81 years, a capital has 
been built and a city of 300,000 has taken form in a unique setting of mountains, 
bush, forests and lakes. It did not happen by chance, and it did not happen 
overnight 
Early landmarks were: the 1908 selection by Parliament of Canberra as 
the future site of Australia's capital; the 1911 delineation of the Australian 
Capital Territory; the 1912 selection of the plan for the capital by Walter Burley 
Griffin; and the first public works, including the reforestation and landscaping 
program launched in 1913---the capital's "birth date". Progress was halting, 
partly due to World War I, and Parliament did not meet in Canberra until 19'2:1. 
Private development began in 1924, but growth was slow through the Depression 
and World War II. 
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With new impetus and new infusion of funds, planning for new towns and 
major expansion began in the late 1950s.1 Lake Burley Griffin, the centrepiece 
of the city, was completed in 1963, and the monumental buildings along the south 
shore-the National Library, the High Court, and the National Gallery-took 
shape. The new Parliament House, built to replace the "temporary" Old 
Parliament House, was completed in 1988, and self-government was granted 
Canberra in 1989. 
With self-government, a worldwide reputation as a beautiful, planned city, 
and a stable base of people and jobs, Canberra has achieved much. The time has 
come, not only for birthday congratulations, but also for a look to the future. In 
particular, we ask how the public sector-now the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT) Government-should participate in the growth and development of this 
future Canberra? More specifically, given the fact that all land is publicly owned 
and leased to private users, how could the ACT Government best manage this 
asset? 
At first glance, Canberra's leasehold system might appear to be the ideal 
tool for the planning, development and management of its land. Public 
ownership of land has allowed Canberra's planners to coordinate development 
with the provision of services and facilities. It has also permitted planners to 
retain a substantial portion of the land in greenbelts and other forms of open 
space. Public land ownership means that it is less expensive to build and extend 
roads, bicycle paths, and utility networks because there is no need to purchase 
land. Moreover, charges for the use of land allow the public sector to recoup a 
large part of the cost of providing services and facilities. 
Some of the benefits of public land ownership are quite visible to the 
1 The term "new town" refers to the major new districts of the city. 
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casual observer. Canberra has an extensive and attractive system of open spaces 
of various types, many trees have been planted, and hills and mountains that have 
been protected from development. An extensive network of bicycle paths serves 
both recreation and commuting needs. Congestion is almost non-existent on its 
well-planned road system. Land use is carefully controlled to avoid many of the 
unsightly features all too common in other cities: there are no billboards and no 
automobile-oriented strip commercial areas along the main roads. 
The administration of a leasehold system would seem to be a relatively 
straightforward process. 1be government would presumably auction sites for 
development or redevelopment, with the price bid at the auction serving as the 
valuation for the purpose of determining land rents. Frequent revaluations would 
ensure that land rents captured increases in land value over time. Leases could 
also be traded privately. Changes in use would be approved subject to planning 
guidelines, and would be the occasion for a revaluation, so that future land rents 
would capture increases in value associated with the change. 
All of this seems quite simple; however, the reality of leasehold 
administration in Canberra is extraordinarily complicated. Although the original 
system was based on land rents, they were subsequently abolished for all 
practical purposes, and replaced by a "premium" system that requires an up-front 
payment of the capital value of land converted from rural to urban use, and 
subsequent premiums to reflect increases in property value, or "bettennent", 
resulting from granting of permission for a change in use. 1be issue of how to 
determine the amount of this betterment is a thorny one, and a succession of 
policy changes has been implemented in recent years, influenced by a range of 
planning and political considerations. Unfortunately, some of the changes have 
not been well-informed by an understanding of basic principles. 
It is our intention in this paper to explain the basic principles of betterment 
4 
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capture that we believe should be applied in Canberra, given its "premium" 
system. We also describe land use planning in Canberra under its leasehold 
system of land tenure. We illustrate current issues regarding betterment capture 
and planning with two case studies, one of a newly developing greenfield site, 
the other of an older subwb now undergoing redevelopment. We preface our 
analysis with overviews of the government and planning of Canberra, and the 
history of its leasehold system. The concluding section of the paper offers some 
specific policy recommendations. In particular, we recommend that the ACT 
Government return to playing a larger role in development of greenfield sites and 
that 100 per cent of betterment be charged when permission is given for a change 
in land use. Moreover, we argue that betterment should be calculated as the 
change in total property value resulting from permission for a new use, rather 
than simply the change in land value as specified in current regulations. 
The government and planning of Canberra 
The history of the government and planning of Canberra and the ACT 
establishes the context for the study of leasehold policies.2 Until 1989, the ACT 
was administered by the national ("Commonwealth") government, and there was 
little, if any, formal nexus between the costs of providing wban services and the 
revenues collected from within the ACT. Consequently, the leasehold system 
was only occasionally viewed as an important source of revenue, and leasehold 
policies generally reflected a desire to attract development to the growing city, 
rather than to safeguard leases as a source of government revenue. In recent 
2 
"Canberra" is simply the urbanised pan of the Australian Capital Territory; it does not designate a political jurisdiction, and has no government separate from the ACT Government 
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years, self-government has dictated that more attention be given to the costs of 
services and the sources of funding, and also to the relationship between 
leasehold and development policies. Although, as we will argue, a number of 
mistakes have been made, we believe that the climate of rethinking and 
experimentation encouraged by self-government may ultimately lead to a more 
efficient approach to urban development, without sacrificing the quality of that 
development 
Government of the Australian Capital Territory 
5 
Canberra was designated the national capital in 1911. The site is within 
the Australian Capital Territory, which is an area of 2,359 square kilometres (911 
square miles) carved out of the state of New South Wales. The Seat of 
Government (Administration) Act of 1910 provided that the Commonwealth 
should resume and retain title to the land on which Canberra was to be built, and 
this provision remains the basis for Canberra's leasehold system today. The first 
resumption of land for the capital by the government--798 hectares in 
1911-was in Acton, now home of the Australian National University. After a 
competition among architects from around the world, Walter Burley Griffin of 
Chicago was chosen to design the capital in 1912. A ceremony to name the city 
and to marlc commencement of construction was held in 1913. Parliament first 
met in Canberra when the temporary Parliament House opened in 1927. Growth 
was slow during the Depression, and Canberra had achieved a population of only 
11,000 in 1939. Little further growth occurred during World War II. In the 
1950s, some government functions were moved from Melbourne, with the 
population reaching 38,000 in 1957 (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Population of the Australian Capital Territory 
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Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Year Book and Census of 
Population and Housing (various years a and b). 
From the founding of the ACT until mid-1989, the Commonwealth was 
responsible for territorial (state) and local government administration in the ACT 
as well as for the normal functions of a national government. In 1988, the same 
year in which the permanent Parliament House opened, legislation enabling self-
government for the ACT was adopted. The first Legislative Assembly took 
office in May 1989. The Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 
1988 is the principal law establishing the structure of territorial government and 
its relation to th~ Commonwealth Government. 1lle legislation provides for a 17 
member Assembly to be expanded in the future as Canberra grows. The first 
elected government consisted of an alliance of members of the Labor and other 
parties. This alliance proved unstable and fell in December 1989, to be replaced 
by a coalition of Liberal, Residents Rally, and Independent members. Although 
remaining in the minority, Labor regained power as a minority government with 
the support of smaller parties in 1991, and retained that position after the triennial 
election in 1992. 
Planning up to the establishment of self-government in 1989 
The Walter Burley Griffin plan, for a city of 75,000, was geometrically 
structured with key points set by the topography of Canberra. It provided for a 
7 
Leasehold Policies and Uuul Use Planning in Canberra 
government sector (the "Capital"), a commercial sector ("Civic"), separated from 
the Capital by a lake, sites for monwnental buildings, a market, an industrial area, 
and residential sectors ("garden suburbs"), all interspersed by open lands, and all 
based on axes sited with reference to the dominant mountains and hills. Griffin 
continued to work in Canberra on his plan until a falling out with local officials 
after World War I. Very little had been built by the time he departed. 
Parliament established the Federal Capital Commission in 1924, to carry 
on with implementation of the Griffin plan; however, following rapid growth in 
the late twenties, development was slow prior to the establishment of the 
National Capital Development Commission (NCDC), in 1957, under the 
leadership of Sir John Overall. The NCDC was charged with carrying out the 
Griffin plan as somewhat modified by Lord Holford in 1958. The lake (Lake 
Burley Griffin) and bridges were built in the early 1960s, and suburbs multiplied. 
The Future Canberra, issued by the NCDC in 1965, was a design for a 
city of 250,000, with the ridge lines, hilltops, and rivers to be protected while 
development was to be located in the valleys following the concepts of the 
Griffin plan. Generous Commonwealth funding starting in the 1960s enabled 
early construction of physical and social infrastructure in the new towns. The 
first new town added to the Griffin plan, Woden-Weston Creek, was begun in 
1964, and the second, Belconnen, in 1966. Population growth was 75 per cent 
by migration from outside Canberra, mostly of young families who settled in the 
greenfield sites. Inner Canberra--roughly the original settlement anticipated by 
Griffin's plan---had a population of 84,000 by 1969; Woden-Weston Creek had 
reached 50,000 by 1972; and Belconnen had reached 68,000 by 1978. The 
infrastructure had been based on the asswnption of 3.9 persons per household for 
Inner Canberra and the two new towns. 
In 1970, the NCDC published Tomorrow's Canberra, also called the Y-
8 
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Plan, because Belconnen, the third new town-Tuggeranong, and the newly 
proposed Gungahlin new town formed branches of a Y. By 1970, the NCOC's 
expectations for Canberra growth had been extended much further into the future: 
now the planners were considering somewhere between 500,000 and one million 
people, of whom over half a million could be accommodated in the ACT as then 
delineated. The plan called for a linear series of towns of 75,000 to 150,000, 
each with a town centre and a substantial number of jobs. The new towns were 
to be linked to Inner Canberra and each other by peripheral arterials and by a 
public transport spine. Balanced development, particularly of Commonwealth 
offices in the town centres, was called for so that Civic would not dominate. 
Planning assumptions were that there would be 3.6 persons per dwelling, and that 
85 per cent of the population would live in single family detached homes, 7 .5 per 
cent in higher density units, and the remainder in hostels and similar housing. The 
third new town, Tuggeranong, was begun in 1972, also with a projection of 3.6 
persons per household. 
By 1980, the NCDC had again lowered its household size projection, now 
to 3.1, based on lower birth rates, an ageing population, less in-migration, and 
more women in the work force. In total, this led to reduced estimates for 
population in each of the towns at full development, as shown in Table 1. The 
NCDC's 1984 Metropolitan Canberra Policy Plan & Development Plan 
concluded that residents would prefer to live at the lower projected densities than 
in suburbs densified through redevelopment to meet the original projections. 
This conclusion would be overturned only two years later in the NCDC's 1986 
Urban Consolidation report.3 The report called for higher "block yield for 
3 The tenn "urban consolidation" is used widely in Australia to refer to more intensive use of 
already developed or serviced areas, by means of infill or redevelopment 
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standard housing, a larger range and greater proportion of higher-density 
housing" (p. 73) for the yet to be developed new town of Gungahlin, 
encouragement of dual occupancy, urban infill with higher density housing, and 
redevelopment in Inner Canberra with medium-density housing. 
Table 1. Population forecasts for Canberra districts 
when fully developed, 1970 and 1980 
Inner Canberra 
Woden-Weston Creek 
Belconnen 
Tuggeranong 
Gungahlin 
Total 
Date of forecast 
1970 1980 
100,000 64,000 
90,000 62,500 
120,000 83,000 
150,000 140,000 
110,000 85,000 
570,000 434,000 
Change 
-36.0 
-30.6 
-30.8 
-6.7 
-22.7 
-21.0 
Source: NCDC, Metropolitan Issues Public Discussion Paper (1980), 
p. 61 , Table 12. 
9 
Faced with funding cuts in the mid-1980s, the NCDC also began exploring 
ways to shift responsibility for seivicing sites and for detailed subdivision design 
to the private sector, and, by 1988, it was forced to draw back from these roles. 
These changes resulted fi:om the end of generous funding for Canberra's 
development and increasing pressures for Canberra to "pay its way", after 
making allowances for the special costs of a national capital. Infill, it was 
argued, could permit better use of infrastructure in suburbs that had lost 
population and especially had fewer children of school age. These pressures 
were to become much stronger as the move toward self-government proceeded 
and as public expenditure generally was restricted. 
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Planning under self-government• 
I 
Both the ACT Government and the Commonwealth have planning 
responsibilities for the ACT. While the Commonwealth owns the land, the ACT 
Government manages the leasehold system and retains revenues from lease sales 
and betterment. The Commonwealth's planning interests are administered by the 
National Capital Planning Authority (NCPA), while the Territory's planning 
responsibilities are handled by the Territory Planning Authority (TP A), a division 
of the ACT' s Department of Environment, Land and Planning (DELP). The 
separate Land Division of DELP has responsibility for the leasehold system; 
within that Division, the Land Development Branch is concerned with land 
development and the Lease Administration Branch with management of 
established leases. 
The role and policies of the National Capital Planning Authority 
The Australian capital Territory (Planning and Land Management) Act 
1988 is the Commonwealth statute that allocates planning responsibility between 
the Commonw~th and the ACT Government The Act: 
• disestablished the NCDC and established the NCPA; 
• required that NCPA prepare, update, and administer the National Capital 
Plan, to include general land use and transport policies for the ACT; 
• authorised the NCP A to define National Land-land used by or on behalf 
of the Commonwealth---end to manage such land; 
• authorised the NCPA to define Designated Areas-land that has special 
characteristics related to Canberra's status as National capital-and to 
specify "detailed conditions of planning, design and development" for that 
4 See Wensing (1992) for additional discussion of this topic. 
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land (Section 10(1)); and 
• required that the ACT Government prepare a Territory Plan consistent 
· with the National Capital Plan. 
The Australian Capital Territory Land (Planning and Environment) Act 1991 
(gazetted January 1992) is the ACT Government's statute that specifies how 
planning shall be carried out, and that established the TP A. 
11 
Thus, the NCP A sets the strategic framework for development in the ACT 
and, as well, carries out detailed planning for Designated Areas. Some National 
Land, as defined by the NCPA, is located in Designated Areas, and, therefore, is 
within the jurisdiction of the NCPA for detailed planning. Some National Land, 
such as government offices in the town centres, lies outside Designated Areas, 
and, therefore, is within the jurisdiction of the TP A for detailed planning. The 
NCPA published the National Capital Plan in 1990. It states a commitment to 
respect the Griffin plan in its geometry and its intent. It identifies and specifies 
policies for seven types of land, ranging from Urban to Mountain and Bushland. 
The Plan calls for "the maximum possible concentration of future urban 
development within the boundaries of the Territory, compared with alternatives 
such as extensive urban development outside the Territory boundaries" (p. 13). 
The Plan forecasts a population of 385,000 by 2007, of whom 85,000 would live 
in the new town of Gungablin. It also calls for development of the north-west 
edge of Belconnen and for urban consolidation in existing towns. Major 
employment, as in prior plans, is to be located in the town centres. The National 
Capital Plan is the sole plan for Designated Areas, and development there must 
be approved by the NCP A. If the ACT proposes changes to the National 
Capital Plan for sites in Designated Areas, the Plan must be amended by the 
NCPA and not then disallowed by Parliament. 
12 
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The role and policies of the Territory Planning Authority 
The Territory Plan was prepared by the TPA and approved in September 
1993, following extended discussion of the Draft Territory P Ian, released in 
1991. The Plan covers non-Designated Territory Land and envisions growth to a 
population of 400,000. This growth is to be accommodated by "some expansion 
of existing towns; redevelopment in selected locations at higher densities; and the 
use of suitable vacant or underdeveloped sites." Following development of 
Gungahlin, a fifth new town is envisioned at Jerrabomberra. A maximum of 20 
per cent of ACT jobs is to be located in Civic. The Plan is implemented by: (1) 
wording and enforcement of the lease purpose clause; (2) management of public 
lands; (3) controlled activities, including lease purpose clause variations; (4) 
procedures for variations for defined lands; (5) guidelines for 17 policy areas; 
and (6) planning guidelines. 
The Territory Plan places considerable emphasis on redevelopment The 
ACT Government's policy, articulated in June 1993, by Clrief Minister Rosemary 
Follett, stated that in the future there will be a 50/50 split between new 
development and redevelopment or consolidation. This policy, as well as several 
others, engendered heated debate prior to adoption of the Plan. 
The ACT Government's presentation to the Commonwealth Government's 
Industry Commission Inquiry, in April 1992, had included the 50/50 target as one 
scenario. The assumptions were that 45,000 dwelling units should be provided 
by 2005, or 1,750 each per year at greenfield and urban redevelopment or infill 
sites. The Inquiry found that upgrading existing water, drainage and electricity to 
cater for redevelopment might cost more than installing new systems on 
greenfield sites due to the need to replace some of the old systems with 
completely new ones. Demolition of housing with many years of useful life, loss 
of considerable vegetation, and the imposition of higher densities, are other social 
5 
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13 
In contrast, the Economic Priorities Advisory Committee of the ACT 
(EPACT) did an analysis to determine savings for the ACT if the 50/50 policy 
were to be instituted. EPACT concluded that such a policy would result in 
savings, although the effects on housing costs needed to be considered (EPACT, 
1992, p. 30): 
Higher levels of greenfield activity result in lower overall 
efficiencies in utilisation of all types of infrastructure and in higher 
costs to the community overall. On the other hand, the type of 
greenfield development which has traditionally occurred, with 
greater or lesser subsidies of developments, has ensured access to 
the housing market for lower income earners. At the same time, the 
subsidisation of greenfield development and other housing/taxation 
policies have narrowed both demand and supply in existing areas to 
the exclusion of the bulk of new households. . . . Higher levels of 
urban renewal and redevelopment, on the other hand, provide 
greater efficiencies in the utilisation of existing infrastructure 
and-since the greater proportion of this infrastructure is funded by 
Govemment--result in lower overall costs to the community. 
Redevelopment will be encouraged by permitting: conversion of houses 
for dual occupancy; strata titling 
6 
for as few as two units as compared to the 
former minimum of four units; medium density in the designated areas of Inner 
(North and South) Canberra; and urban infill. A 1993 study by Masterplan Pty 
'Canberra Times, 19 September 1993. 
6 I.e., condominium ownership. 
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Ltd anticipates that, under the Territory Plan, up to 15 per cent, or 450 units per 
year of additional dwellings, will be dual occupancy. 
Eighty per cent of the redevelopment housing would be in Inner Canberra, 
of which 60 per cent would be in North Canberra (that part of Inner Canberra 
north of Lake Burley Griffin). The area designated in North Canberra includes 
some 1,000 homes that average 30 years in age. To qualify for redevelopment, 
the Plan requires that at least three blocks7 totalling 0.3 hectares (0.74 acres) be 
assembled. 
Further support for the ACT Government's 50/50 policy comes from the 
Commonwealth Government's Better Cities Program, which is strongly 
committed to urban consolidation. Total national funding over five years is $816 
million. It was announced, in early 1993, that the ACT will receive $14 million 
for four projects, of which three will be in North Canberra: a joint venture in the 
suburb 8 of Braddon by the Housing Trust and a private developer that will 
include affordable housing; planning and infrastructure design for a new 
residential development in North Watson, a partly developed suburb; housing for 
the mentally disabled; and an innovative waste water recycling project. 
Other issues debated about the Draft Territory Plan were the use of 
zoning (the "Predominant Land Use Zone", or PLUZ) as one tool for 
implementation and the level of the betterment charge that should be imposed on 
redevelopment. The second of these issues will be reviewed in the following 
section of this paper, in a discussion of the recent history of the leasehold sys~m. 
7 
"Parcels" or "lots" in United States' usage. 
1 
"Suburb" in Australia is roughly analogous to "neighbourhood" in the U.S.; all 
neighbourhoods except the central business district are referred to as suburbs. Suburbs do not 
correspond to any political jurisdictions in the ACT. They typically contain a local shopping 
centre and community facilities, including a playing field and primary school. 
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In regard to the first issue, the Barton Residents Association, responding to the 
Draft Territory Plan, had objected specifically to its use of the PLUZ and to its 
proposals for consolidation in North and South Canberra. The grounds for the 
objection to the PLUZs were: 
The Draft Plan's proposal to introduce a system of Predominant 
Land Use Zones is reckless and irresponsible. To the extent that a 
PLUZ gives rise to expectations of new development rights it will 
further undermine the credibility of the ACT leasehold system, 
which a number of official inquiries over the last decade or more 
have concluded must be maintained as the basis of land use and 
planning in Canberra.9 
The Chief Minister for the ACT had previously responded to the Barton 
Residents Association. backing away from use of the PLUZ: 
We have ... decided that planning for residential areas will not be 
based on a broad zoning system. Changes to land use in existing 
residential areas must involve full consultation and rights of 
10 
appeal. 
Although the actual Territory Plan does not refer to PLUZs or zoning, it 
does in fact identify districts where certain changes in land use are encouraged. 
A notable example of this is the "B 1" district, where residential redevelopment in 
the form of three-storey apartment buildings is encouraged. The implication is 
that redevelopment projects of this sort will be approved in the B 1 area, if they 
91..etter from the Barton Residents Association to George Tomlins, Chief Planner, TPA, 
20 March 1992. 
'
0 Letter from Rosemary Follett, ACT Chief Minister, to Ian Morison, Barton Residents 
Association, 10 February 1992. 
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also meet the TPA's design and siting criteria. 
Ed Wensing, long-time Canberra resident, planner, and critic of lease 
administration, argues that: 
One of the basic principles of leasehold in the ACT is that lessees 
have no presumptive rights in potential or future land uses. . . . New 
development rights always rest with the ground landlord and never 
with the lessee. 1be new planning system encourages the view that 
presumptive rights do exist and that leasehold tenure is more similar 
to freehold than it really is (Wensing, 1993, p. 16). 
Regional planning and the Australian Capital Territory 
Canberra's location, size and rate of growth make it the centre of an 
unusual region, by Australian standards. Australia's total population is 17 
million, of whom 39 per cent are concentrated in the Sydney and Melbourne 
metropolitan areas. Canberra, together with its neighbour municipality, 
Queanbeyan, is the only large non-coastal urban area in the nation. Between 
1986 and 1993, Australia grew at a rate of 1.4 per cent per annum, while 
Canberra grew at a rate of 2.1 per cent. 
There has been a regional planning process under way, since 1990, for an 
area including the ACT and extending into parts of New South Wales (NSW) 
whose economic future is closely related to that of Canberra. Participants in the 
process are the NCPA, the TP A, the NSW Department of Planning, and planners 
from the affected NSW local governments. The Planning Committee is 
anticipating a regional population of 538,000 by 2016, which would be a 69 per 
cent increase over the 1989 population of 322,250, of whom 277 ,700 lived in 
Canberra. 
In March 1994, the NCPA and the ACT Minister for Environment, Land 
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and Planning announced an ideas competition for what could be Canberra's fifth 
new town, Jerrabomberra. Unlike any of the previous new towns, Jerrabomberra 
is located partly in the ACT and partly in New South Wales, in the municipality 
of Queanbeyan, and if it proceeds would be designed in cooperation with the 
governments of NSW and Queanbeyan. 
If Jerrabomberra goes ahead, it will be a fundamental change to the Y 
Plan. . . . 1be aims of the Y Plan were to avoid a circular mass of city, to 
allow greenbelts between townships and to prevent Canberra spilling over 
the border. Jerrabomberra does not have a natural border between it and 
the city to the north, though there is a line of hills between it and W oden, 
and there is no reason why it cannot blend into Queanbeyan.11 
History of the Canberra leasehold system 
To the outside world, Canberra appears to be a model of a leasehold 
system in which bettennent accrues to the public sector. The reality has never 
matched the image. Bettennent collection has evolved over three major periods 
in Canberra: from 1924, when private leases were first issued, to 1970, when 
collection of land rents was largely abandoned; from 1970 to self-government in 
1989; and since 1989. In the first of the three periods, Canberra had the structure 
for a simple, transparent bettennent system. There was one serious flaw, 
however. Because land was revalued only once in 10 or 20 years, rents often 
lagged seriously behind the appreciation in land values. Land rents were 
replaced in 1970 by premiums for greenfield sites and bettennent fees for 
variations to lease purpose clauses. Provisions were adopted allowing remission 
11 Crispin Hull, Canbe"a Times, 27 March 1994. 
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of 50 per cent of betterment fees in most cases. The five years since self-
government have been a time of experiment, of revisions to the betterment laws, 
and of rethinking the role of betterment. 
Up to self-govemment12 
In 1901, the six formerly separate colonies in Australia came together to 
form a single nation. In the Constitutional Conventions during the 1890s that 
developed the form of the Australian federation, the location, planning and land 
policy for the national capital were important issues and they continued to be 
debated in Parliament in the first decade after federation. Land policy, squatting, 
speculation and the leasing and sale of crown land had been major political issues 
in the colonies throughout the nineteenth century. The issues were sharpened by 
the publication of Henry George's Progress and Poverty in 1879, and by his visit 
to Australia in 1889-90 (Brennan 1971 ). One of the legacies of that influence bas 
been the use in some of the states of the unimproved value of land as a base for 
local and state government taxes. 
Section 125 of the Constitution, the Seat of Government Act 1908 and the 
Seat of Government (Acceptance) Act 1909 provide for the Australian Capital 
Territory to be selected and established as the seat of government. The Seat of 
Government (Administration) Act 1910 provides for the purchase of the site for 
the National Capital and for the land to remain the property of the 
· Commonwealth Government and be leased rather than sold for housing and 
business. 
There was no option but for the government to take responsibility for 
building the capital: no private developer would have taken the risk, especially . 
12For more detail, see Brennan (1971) and Neutte (1987, 1988a, 1988b). 
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when there was a minority view that it was a waste of public funds. One of the 
main reasons for the decision to acquire the site and lease rather than sell land for 
urban uses was to permit the government to reap the benefit of the increase in the 
value of land which would result from the establislnnent and subsequent growth 
of the city. There had been many experiences of colonial governments selling 
crown land cheaply and subsequently having to buy it back at much higher prices 
for public use. 
The founding father8 of the Australian federation were committed to the 
Georgist view that, since most of the value of property in the city would.be 
created by public expenditure, its "betterment", or increase in value, should 
accrue to the public purse. They wanted to prevent the scandalous speculation 
that had occurred around other Australian cities (Cannon 1966) and expected that 
revenue from land would meet, in part at least, the cost of building the national 
capital. Finally, they were firmly committed to a planned national capital, and 
launched an international competition for its design in 1911. The plan would be 
implemented through conditions placed on leases to ensure that both the nature 
and timing of development were in accord with the plan. 
From market rents to market premiums 
The first leases, issued in 1924 under the City Area Leases Ordinance 
1924 and Regulations made thereunder, specified the purposes for which sites 
could be used in only very broad terms such as "residential" or a very broad class 
of business. They were to be for not more than 99 years, there was a reserve 
capital value, and they were auctioned with the rent for the first 20 years set at 
five per cent of the sum bid. At the end of 20 years, and after each subsequent 
10 years the site was to be revalued for the purpose of adjusting the land rent. 
Following some speculative trading in undeveloped leases, special permission 
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was required for the transfer of undeveloped leases. Regulations leflUired that a 
building be commenced within two years and completed within three. At the end 
of 99 years, if the lease was not required by the Commonwealth, the lessee 
would be entitled to a further lease on conditions laid down at that time. 
The Commonwealth Government, as the sole owner of land, had a 
monopoly on development, which made it very open to criticism when, in the late 
1920s, it underestimated the demand for sites. The Federal Capital Commission, 
which was responsible for the development of Canberra according to the Burley 
Griffin plan from 1925 to 1930, was blamed for the shortage of serviced sites. 
Despite the fact that the provisional parliament house was being built, the 
Commission did not anticipate the level of demand. 
The Commission was expected to act in a commercial manner and it was 
accused of restricting the supply in order to keep up land rents. There was very 
little immediate financial constraint on the amount bid, since bidders were 
required to pay only the first year's land rent-five per cent of the amount 
bid-in order to secure the lease. The Commission was concerned about the 
' 
artificially high bids that resulted. It yielded to pressure and made more leases 
available, but its concerns were well-founded: one third of the leases auctioned 
between 1924 and 1929 were subsequently surrendered; some of them remained 
vacant for many years. 
The leasehold system was criticised almost from its inception. In 1928, 
the Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts reported criticisms of: the 
financial uncertainty that resulted from rent reviews; restrictions on the use of 
land imposed by the lease conditions; the lower value of a lease compared with 
freehold title, which reduced its value as security for borrowing; and restrictions 
on transfer of undeveloped leases. Some of these concerns were genuine: it was 
well into the 1960s before lenders accepted leases as being as good security as 
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freehold. The inability to transfer the lease before a building was completed, and 
the government's right to resume it if the building was not completed within tliree 
years, were problems and were eased by understanding, some would say lax, 
administration: few leases were terminated. 
The erosions of the pure rental leasehold system began in 1935, with the 
extension of revisions of land rent, after the first 20 years of a lease, from 10- to 
20-year intervals. On the positive side, in that year, bidders were required to pay 
any excess bid over the reserve price in cash, and the land rent was based on the 
reserve price rather than the bid price. This discouraged excessive bids and may 
have been a necessary change. Nevertheless, it was the first step from a pure 
rental leasehold system towards a premium system. During the 1930s and 1940s 
the city grew slowly, and leases could be purchased over the counter at reserve 
prices. Auctions were reintroduced in 1951, when the rapid post-war growth in 
the population increased demand: Canberra's population nearly doubled 
between 1947and1955, from 16,000 to 31,000. In 1961, lOpercent of the 
population lived in government hostels and 58 per cent of the houses and flats 
were rented from the government. 
In the 1960s premiums increased dramatically. Speculative builders 
became more prominent in the bidding. To avoid a situation in which aspiring 
home owners would always be outbid by speculative builders, some sites were 
reserved for people who had not previously had a lease in the ACT. Rapidly 
rising prices with land rents adjusted only every 20 years resulted in the owners 
of lots, which were similar except that they had been auctioned at a different 
date, paying very different levels of land rent. Land rents on sites released in the 
1940s rose to several times their previous level when revalued in the 1960s. 
Large increases in the early 1960s resulted in a decision, in 1965, to peg 
residential values for calculation of land rents at their 1962 levels. 
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During the 1960s questions also began to be asked about whether 
Canberra was ''paying its way", questions that had not been considered since the 
1920s. Property rates (or taxes), based on unimproved values, were introduced 
in 1925, but were kept at low levels for the next 45 years, partly to help attract 
public servants to move from Melbourne, the temporary capital, to the raw "bush 
capital". Unlike values for land rent, rateable values were adjusted every three 
years, and rates had the advantage over land rent that, at that time, they could be 
deducted from taxable income for Commonwealth taxation purposes. 
An expedient way was found to deal with all of these problems. In 1970, 
during a by-election campaign for the seat of Canberra, the then Prime Minister, 
John Gorton, announced that urban land rents would be reduced to a 
''peppercorn" rent payable only if and when demanded, and the loss of revenue 
would be made up by a substantial increase in the level of property rates. 
Abolition of land rent was a popular move, though not popular enough for the 
government to win the seat from the opposition Labor party. Although, following 
a change in government, land rents were reintroduced for business premises in 
1974, another change in the law saw business lessees given the opportunity, in 
1980, to buy out their future rental obligations. Canberra's leasehold system had 
become a premium leasehold system. 
Recovery of betterment that arises as a result of development of the city 
was one of the most important objectives of the leasehold system, but its 
effectiveness in this regard was compromised from the outset by the infrequent 
revisions of land rents; revisions every two to five years would have overcome 
this problem. In periods of rapid inflation it was a fatal flaw. The effective 
abolition of land rents in 1970 resulted in the rates on unimproved values being 
the only avenue for government recovering part of the increase in value of land 
that did not experience a change of use. As a result, economically, if not legally, 
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Canberra's leasehold closely resembled freehold. 
Planning and the collection of betterment 
The two important objectives of the Canberra leasehold system were to 
implement the plan for the development of the national capital and to collect for 
the public a large amount of the increase in land values that would result from its 
construction. 
The lease purpose clauses of the first Canberra leases were used to put 
flesh on the bones of Burley Griffin's competition-winning plan for Canberra: 
leases were issued for the use of land for the purposes shown in the plan. 
Effectively, the purpose clauses in lease agreements performed the functions that 
statutory land use controls play elsewhere in Australia. Many of the early leases 
had very general purpose clauses and these caused legal arguments years later 
when owners of "residential" leases claimed the right to build flats or motels. In 
the harsh economic climate of the 1930s businesses were often permitted to use 
their leases for any purpose that could bring a profit. This continues in 
prosperous Canberra today in the suburb of Fyshwick, for example, where many 
retail businesses do not conform with the industrial purposes permitted by their 
leases. 
Rural to urban conversion. An important objective of leasehold was to 
ensure that decisions about land use would be made according to the plan for 
development of the city rather than being the responsibility of individual land 
owners. Elsewhere in Australia the profits that can be made from land 
development have resulted in strong pressures that are frequently opposed to the 
implementation of land use plans. Land owners exert political and economic 
pressure on government to permit them to use their land for purposes they judge 
will yield the highest value. 
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In Canberra these pressures do not occur at the time of conversion of land 
I 
from rural to urban uses because there are no private owners of rural land Rural 
lessees have never seriously attempted to secure urban development rights. 
Some indication of what would have happened had rural land been privately 
owned can be seen in the proposal in the 1970s by the owners of Lanyon, the last 
freehold property in the Canberra locality, that was then some distance from the 
developed suburbs of Canberra, to develop it for urban use. When the 
government moved to purchase the land, the owners had a development plan 
prepared and claimed the value of the land for urban development as 
compensation. They were unsuccessful. Without the provisions of the Seat of 
Govennnent (Administration) Act for the site of Canberra to be purchased, the 
development proposal could have resulted in urban development that was not in 
accord with the metropolitan plan. 
An early experience of another form of privatisation of development 
occurred in the 1970s in the small suburb of South Bruce where a private 
developer was sold a construction lease on raw land and permitted to both 
subdivide and service residential allotments according to a timetable specified in 
an agreement with the govennnent. The timetable was not met, and the 
developer claimed that demand was not sufficiently strong to meet it. It is almost 
impossible under such circumstances for the government to prevent speculative 
holding of land because it cannot distinguish between a genuine miscalculation 
on both its part and the developer's, and the developer holding land off the 
market in order to increase its price. That problem has not been resolved in the 
more recent moves to privatise land development that will be discussed later. 
Until 1987, the NCDC was the developer of all greenfield sites in 
Canberra. As developer, the NCDC carried out (commonly through contracts 
with private firms) site planning, installation of major and local infrastructure, 
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subdivision. provision of community facilities, and building of public housing, 
and made available blocks to be marketed to builders and individuals. There was . 
no role for the private land subdivider. At that time, negotiations to establish 
self-government were under way, and the Commonwealth budget for the ACT 
deleted monies for land development by the NCDC, with the intention that many 
aspects of future development would be by private enterprise. Some thought this 
a desirable outcome, having doubts as to the NCDC's skills at financial analysis 
and marketing. Land supply and major infrastructure construction---including 
highways, storm water drainage systems, and sewer syste~were to remain the 
role of government. The NCDC then articulated a set of procedures and 
standards that it would apply in auctioning greenfield sites for development, and 
a five year land release program was prepared. 
Urban to other urban conversion. If the leasehold system has prevented 
private pressures on land use plans in the conversion of land from rural to wban 
uses, it has not done so in the conversion of land from one urban use to another, 
whether or not this involves redevelopment. There are several reasons for this 
failure. 
The first has been a long history of lack of enforcement of compliance with 
lease purpose clauses. Perhaps the most common violation has been the use of 
residential leaseholds close to commercial centres for non-residential purposes. 
Some of these have been for professional offices, and within limits they have 
been sanctioned by a legislative amendment that permitted, for example, doctors' 
surgeries to be run from the home of a doctor in a residential area. More 
damaging have been the widespread use of industrial leases, especially in 
Fyshwick, for retailing and of houses wholly for running businesses. 
The second has been an unwillingness of the government to become 
actively involved in redevelopment as has been the practice of lessors in 
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leasehold systems in other countries. A major reason for this reluctance has been 
to avoid any suggestion that leases were less secure than freehold title. 1bat was 
a legitimate concern until the 1960s but has not been since then. The result has 
been that Canberra leases are in fact more secure than freehold, but achieving 
such security has meant that some of the rights and controls the lease gives the 
lessor have been compromised through lack of use. 
The third is that, unlike rural lessees, urban lessees and developers acting 
with their agreement, have "claimed" development rights. The reluctance of the 
government to buy out the remaining terms of leases, and especially to 
compulsorily resume them, has left all of the initiative with lessees and private 
developers. 
One of the most important changes in lease administration occurred in the 
1930s when, to accommodate an owner who wished to subdivide two shop 
leases into four, a new section (Section 1 lA) was introduced into the City Area 
Leases Ordinance that allowed a lessee to apply to the ACT Supreme Court for a 
variation in the lease purpose clause. The responsible Minister had, in effect, the 
power to veto such applications, but rarely exercised il In the 1980s, when 
redevelopment in the central parts of the city boomed, this was the method of 
obtaining permission for land use changes. The fact that it is initiated by the 
lessee, or a prospective developer on the lessee's behalf, rather than the owner of 
the site, reflects the fact that Canberra leases had come to be seen as much like 
freehold. 
Until 1970, any change in the lease purpoSe clause was the signal for 
reassessment of land rents which, in theory at least, recouped for the government 
the increase in value when a land use change occurred. Starting in 1970, some of 
the increase in value resulting from a change in use has been recovered through a 
betterment charge that is the equivalent of the premium paid for a rent-free lease. 
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The additional premium is payable when pennission is granted to use the lease 
for a more valuable purpose. The charge was set at half of the increase in the 
value of the lease as a result of the permitted change in use, less $1,500. 
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The fmal opportunity to collect betterment under the original leases occurs 
when they mature and the land and improvements become the property of the 
lessor. This causes problems when leases approach maturity since lessees have 
little incentive to maintain their property and the leases decline in value. In 1938, 
the Commonwealth modified the legislation to compensate lessees for the value 
of improvements if a new lease is not offered at maturity. By the 1980s, non-
residential lessees were permitted to renew their leases well before maturity on 
payment of a modest fee, and residential lessees can renew their leases without 
further payment. De facto if not de jure, Canberra leases had become leases in 
perpetuity. Thus the opportunity was never taken. 
Under self-government 
Rural to urban conyersion 
Private development. Sales of leases of raw land for development by 
restricted public auction began in 1988. Only firms with the financial and 
technical capability to complete the project could bid. The successful bidder 
receives a holding lease, with a specified term of three to five years. This 
enables the developer to obtain financing to service the blocks to be created on 
the site. When a specified number of blocks have been completed, the developer 
is granted Crown Leases for individual blocks and may sell those leases to 
builders or prospective residents. 
At the time of the first auction, only one large developer--the predecessor 
company of Land and National Development, currently a major developer 
-existed in the Canberra area. The MBA Land Ltd corporation was 
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established by expanding the Argyle Consultants, a local builder, to include some 
20 Master Builders Association members. Similarly, a home builder, John 
Ainscough, formed Landco with five or six other members. The initial bidders 
included the above companies and some other consortia from the area and 
elsewhere. 
In the Canberra Times, in April 1993, Trevor Kaine, leader of the ACT 
opposition Liberal Party, alleged that the three largest developers monopolise 
Canberra development, squeezing others out. "Only the Government can make 
sure builders and developers have a fair share of land as it comes available." 
Bob Winnell, chairman of MBA Land, denied the allegation, saying that there are 
10 developers in Canberra. 13 
There are charges also that the three big developers control the housing 
market vertically by selling sites to builders tied to them. One person to allege 
this is a Labor Member of the Legislative Assembly, David Lamont, who called 
for an end to the practice, which "is uncompetitive and is artificially inflating the 
price of new homes in the ACT." Alex Brinkmeyer, head of Land and National 
Development, as well as of the real estate agency Realty World, and developer of 
one-third of greenfield projects to date, acknowledged that this had been the case 
but said that it was no longer so.14 
Since self-government, the reserve price for an auction is set by DELP 
after receiving a recommendation from the Australian Valuation Office; it is not 
made public. Reserve prices are determined in part by consideration of the bids 
at former auctions. If the bids don't reach the reserve, DELP may, with its 
Minister's concurrence, negotiate for a price somewhere between the highest bid 
1
' Canberra Times, 1 April 1993. 
1
' Canberra Times, 2 June 1993. 
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and the reserve, or it may pass the property in for another auction later. 
The Land Division of DELP has a five-year plan for release of sites, based 
on its annual projections of the number of housing starts needed, further specified 
by greenfield sites and redevelopment. 1be current number of starts is 3,300 per 
year; this is projected to decline to 3,200 and then to 3,100. Hans Sommer, 
Assistant Secretary, Land Development Branch, DELP, claims that the ACT can 
obtain good prices for its sites because the developers know that there is little 
risk. 15 The ACT releases sites in accord with demand and guarantees 
construction of the major infrastructure. 
Joint ventures between the ACT and private developers. Bill Wood, ACT 
Minister for Environment, Land and Planning, has said on several occasions that 
government should resume its long-time role as land developer, and that joint 
ventures are the first step.
16 
In fact, in the recent ACT budget, the government 
has committed $5.5 million to recommence public sector land development 
during the 1994~5 financial year. 
Since 1988, the Commonwealth and ACT Governments, as well as the 
Master Builders Association and the Housing Industry Association, have been 
concerned that new development has not been providing affordable housing. A 
market for 200 to 300 blocks per year for such housing was recognised, and 
development has been realised through the mechanism of joint ventures. lbere 
have been regular joint ventures with these Associations since 1989. Joint 
ventures are also seen as a means of achieving higher quality neighbourhood 
15 Interviews with Hans Sommer, Assistant Secretary, Land Development Branch, DELP, 
9 February and 11 March 1994. 
16 
It is unclear to the authors why the ACT could not borrow the necessary funds if the return 
to government development is attractive. 
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development and of realising for the public sector a greater share of the profit 
from development 
The format that has evolved for joint ventures is that ACT commits the 
land under a holding lease, thus enabling its private partner to obtain financing. 
The ACT is paid for the land when leases on the allotments are sold, in accord 
with a timetable specified in the agreement. The ACT installs major 
infrastructure, as in private sector developments. The private partner, in accord 
with a plan developed in concert with the ACT, subdivides and services the 
blocks. As groups of blocks become ready for sale to builders or individuals, the 
Holding Lease is replaced by Crown Leases for individual blocks. The ACT 
receives a minimum of 50 per cent of the before-tax profit. 
Apart from major infrastructure works installed by the ACT, financing is 
provided by the developer. There are now five joint ventures under way with 
varying financial terms, and with partners other than the Associations. Over 30 
companies have registered to participate in the tender process, and, of these, 
some dozen have qualified as financially and technically competent Joint 
ventures are under way at Belconnen and Gungahlin (in the suburbs of 
Ngunnawal and Nicholls). 
An illustration of the financial return to the ACT is the Dunlop urban 
renewal joint ventures in West Belconnen. There were 20 tenders. The two 
winning developers bid a combined total of $5.55 million for the land for projects 
that will produce 610 blocks. The ACT anticipates receiving nearly $5 million in 
profiut share in addition to the purchase price. This, according to Hans Sommer, 
is substantially more than if the site had been auctioned and developed as a 
purely private venture. One reason for the higher returns is that the developers · 
bear less risk than in the auction process. Lenders will provide financing on 
relatively attractive terms (in today's cautious lending market), in part because of 
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the reduced cash exposure due to the delayed payment regime, and in part 
because govenunent participation provides a kind of guarantee of the loan. 
Another advantage for govenunent is that it oversees development more closely 
as a participant, assuring realisation of its objectives.17 Minister Bill Wood 
hailed the project as "the path of the future" providing the govenunent "strong 
input into the design" and responding to "the need for wider housing choice, cost 
effectiveness and environmental responsibility."18 
Urban to other urban conversion 
Under self-govenunent, there have been three successive sets of changes 
to the method of detennining the amount of bettennent to be paid after 
pennission is given for a change in use. The various methods that have been 
employed to date are summarised in Table 2. The first of these changes, Method 
B, superseded what came to be known as Method A, which had prevailed since 
the abolition of all but nominal land rents in 1970. Method A was based on the 
change in total property value (land and improvements) due to the granting of 
pennission for a change in use. All of the subsequent methods for detennination 
of bettennent have been based on the value of land only. 
Method A. Under Method A, as defined in Section 11A of the City Area 
Leases Act (CALA), the "before" and "after" values for the purposes of 
calculating bettennent were both based on the value of land and improvements. 
The before value was the value of the property in its current use, i.e., assuming 
no variation in the purpose clause would be pennitted during the tenn of the 
lease. The after value was the value of the land and pre-existing improvements 
17 Interviews with Hans Sommer, 9 February and 11 March 1994. 
11 Canberra Times, 13 November 1993. 
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for the new use. In the case of demolition and redevelopment, the after value 
was effectively the land value less the cost of demolition. The betterment fee 
was half the increase in value, less $1,500. 
Method B. The first change enacted under self-government was in the 
form of an amendment to CALA, which became effective in February 1990. The 
before value was defined to be the unimproved value as defined in the Rates and 
Land Tax Act 1926, with no assumption that the lease purpose would remain 
unchanged and therefore no requirement to exclude potential for redevelopment. 
It was, however, assumed that the lease would remain in effect for 99 years, 
regardless of its actual remaining term. The after value was defined as the 
unimproved value after the variation had been granted.19 The change seems to 
have been made to align valuation for betterment with valuation for property 
rates without realising that it resulted in inclusion of potential for change of use in 
the before value. 
The law also altered the amount of betterment to be charged. It introduced 
a schedule of remissions ranging from 50 per cent to none. Holders of leases at 
least 20 years into their term were to be charged 50 per cent betterment, and the 
scale rose up to 100 per cent for leases less than 5 years into their term. Most 
leases on which variations were sought were at least 20 years into their terms and 
thus qualified for 50 per cent remission. With before value now including 
development potential, the gap between after and before was significantly 
reduced, and if trends continued would have become minimal. In the extreme, it 
'"The actual language reads: 
"added value" under l lA means ... the amount by which the unimproved value of the 
land immediately after the order was made would have exceeded the unimproved value 
of the land immediately before the order was made if the lease had been varied in the 
manner provided in the provisional order when that order was made. 
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was likely to consist solely of the cost of the risk that the variation might be 
rejected and of the legal fees for registering the variation once granted. 
Method C. The next changes, known as Method C, became effective in 
April 1992. As in the 1990 version, improvements were not included. 
Effectively, the only change from Method B was to omit the previous rule's 
assumption that leases would extend for 99 years. Tiris version is contained in 
the Australian Capital Territory Land (Planning and Environment) Act, 
Regulation 5.20 The remission schedule used for Method B was retained 
unchanged, meaning that most properties qualified for 50 per cent remission. 
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Reactions to the changes. In early- and mid-1993, a number of 
commentators began to question recent changes to the betterment regulations. 
Most were concerned about the fact that the government collected little, if any, of 
the true betterment. One commentator in the Canberra Times went so far as to 
argue that the ACT Government should resume and auction leases whenever land 
use was to be changed: 
20 Section 12 reads as follows: 
"added value'', in relation to a lease to which a variation is proposed, means the 
amount by which the value of the lease immediately after the variation would exceed 
the value of the lease immediately before the variation, it being assumed (a) that there 
are no improvements to or on the land comprised in the lease; and (b) that the rent 
payable throughout the term of the lease is a nominal rent 
Table 2. Methods of betterment calculation2 Australian Ca2ital Territo!l'. 
Method Effective elate Political context Berore value After value Calculation or fee 
A 1970 Abolition of land rents Land and improvements Land and improvements Half the increase in value less 
assuming no variation in (land only if improvements $1,500 
purpose during the tenn of to be demolished) 
_ the lease, i.e., ignoring 
potential value 
B February 1990 Establishment of self- Land only assuming a 99- Land only assuming a 99- 50 to 100% of the increase in value government year lease (no requirement year lease depending upon the age of the lease 
to ignore potential value) 
c April 1992 New ACT Land Act Land only (no assumption Land only (no assumption 50 to 100% of the increase in value 
of a 99-year lease or of a 99-year lease) depending upon the age of the lease 
requirement to ignore 
potential value) 
D September 1993 Public criticisms of Land Act Land only assuming no Land only 100% of the increase in value except provisions variation in pwpose for changes from residential or 
during the tttm of the commercial to residential uses, when lease the 50 to 100% sliding scale applies 
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The Government as owner of the land can determine what the tenant 
(even one with a 99-year lease) does with the land. If the tenant 
changes the use of the land, the Government as landlord can throw 
him off .... We are paying lip service to leasehold. In the 1980s 
the change from residential to office purposes in Civic resulted in 
speculators creaming off. And it seems that the same thing will 
happen in the 1990s with the change from low to medium density 
which is all the rage these days .... If Canberra's leasehold is to 
function in the way intended by its founders, people buying 99-year 
leases should stick to the original lease purpose. If the Government 
wants to change the land use ... it should resume the lease and pay 
compensation. . . . [l]t should then amalgamate leases as necessary 
into larger blocks ... and hold a public auction for them.21 
A less radical approach, elimination of the remission scheme, was 
suggested in a subsequent editorial: 
[T]he ACT Government is even now falling into the trap that land 
development must be encouraged through subsidy, in this case 
through the form of a gift of increased value through change of lease 
purpose. The present ACT Government, quite wrongly, permits a 
developer to pay to consolidated revenue in many cases only 50 per 
cent of the increased value due to changes in land use. This is a 
silly . .. view predicated on a nineteenth century perspective that 
Australia is a barren waste and that people have to be given 
financial encouragement to do anything with it . . . The land here 
21 Crispin Hull, Canberra Times, 24 February 1993. 
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has great worth that belongs to the community.22 
Perhaps the most important point is, as Ed Wensing (1993, p. 16) 
put it, that: ''The granting of development rights at less than their true 
value is an implicit subsidy." These criticisms led to the adoption of what 
we have labelled "Method D", which, among other things, eliminates the 
remission schedule for some types of changes in use. 
Method D. The current regulations became effective in September 1993 
following a Ministerial Statement. As in the 1990 and 1992 regulations, 
calculation of betterment is based on the value of land only. The "before" 
definition, however, returns in part to the definition that prevailed from 1970 to 
1990: the terms of the lease, including the purpose clause of the lease, are 
assumed to remain applicable for the life of the lease. The after definition is as in 
the 1990 and 1992 regulations: the unimproved value immediately after the 
variation is approved. The provisions for remission were retained only for 
changes from residential to more intensive residential uses or from commercial to 
residential uses, due to the government's desire to encourage residential 
redevelopment of inner areas.23 
The economics of betterment 
With public ownership of land, most redevelopment may still be privately 
22
"1..and change profits belong to public," Canbe"a Times, 30 July 1993, p. 10. 
23 Special provisions of the new regulations extended the 50 per cent remission policy to 
Fyshwick for one year only, to encourage owners of leases that are in breach of their lease 
purpose clauses to apply for variations. Also, the nominal "augmentation levies" that have 
been charged in lieu of betterment fees for residential redevelopment projects in the suburbs of 
Kingston and Griffith have been retained. 
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initiated, as is the case in Canberra. Land use is controlled via the purpose 
clause in the lease rather than through methods such as zoning. The distinctive 
feature of a leasehold system, however, is the fact that the government lessor 
owns the rights to develop and to any increment in land value, or "betterment", 
that results from conversion of rural land for urban use and from any subsequent, 
more intensive redevelopment. 
Under a leasehold system, betterment can be captured in one of two ways. 
H land rent is charged, betterment can be obtained from rents which are 
periodically increased. Rents are normally set at a percentage of market value 
such that the expected future stream of land rents is equivalent in present value 
terms to the market value. This would require frequent valuations if land values 
were changing rapidly. In Canberra, however, land rent is not charged (except 
for a limited number of commercial leases), and leaseholders are only potentially 
liable for a nominal ''peppercorn" rent. Instead, betterment is charged at the time 
of initial urban development and on the occasion of any subsequent change in 
nature or intensity ofuse.24 
Thus the issue of betterment capture arises in Canberra at two key stages 
in the development process: (1) when previously undeveloped "greenfield" or 
"broadacre" sites are released for development and (2) when the use of already 
developed sites changes. The two following sections of this paper are case 
studies of greenfield and redevelopment areas in Canberra; the balance of the 
present section is concerned with the principles that will serve as a basis for 
analysis of the case study areas. 
24 
In the following sections of this paper, a "new use" includes increased intensity of an existing 
use, e.g., multi-family relative to single-family housing. 
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Greenfield sites 
Two key principles should inform the policy and practice of capturing 
betterment associated with the release and development of greenfield sites: (1) 
prices should be determined competitively so that they equal market values and 
(2) the release of land should be controlled so that developers do not have the 
opportunity to hold land speculatively with the intent of earning windfall gains. 
The need to determine prices competitiYely 
A basic requirement for the capture of betterment is that the price should 
be established through some kind of competitive market process. If there is 
uncertainty on the part of the seller (i.e., the government) regarding the market 
value of greenfield sites, the optimal price may be determined by auction. On the 
other hand, if market values have been established recently for similar sites, and 
it is easy to assess the market value of the site, it may be possible to arrive at an 
optimal price through negotiation or even to set list prices. 
Controlling the market to prevent specu'/ation 
It is also important to control the release of sites so that supply and 
demand are more or less in equilibrium. This can be accomplished by forecasting 
the demand for various uses, monitoring prices relative to costs, and releasing 
only enough land to satisfy new demands. Developers of new sites should be 
required to complete development within a fixed period of time, as they are in 
Canberra. Otherwise, leases will be acquired for speculative pwposes, and some 
betterment will be pocketed by developers rather than the government. 
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Previously developed sites25 
Lessees have the right to use their sites only for the pwpose(s) specified in 
the lease pwpose clause. A change in use may be achieved either by the lessor 
buying the lease and leasing it to someone else at the higher rent or capital sum 
equal to its value for the new use. The alternative is to negotiate with the 
existing lessee for an additional capital sum or rent for the right to use the site for 
a more valuable purpose. The capital value of the enhanced development rights 
in a premium leasehold system such as Canberra's is known as betterment 
Where land is privately owned, its nuuket value will take account of both 
its value in its present use and the potential increase in its value for any other use 
that is permitted. As a result, a developer has to pay much or all of the increment 
in value expected to be realised through the change in use when purchasing a site 
for a change in use, though developers who purchase far enough in advance of 
the change are able to capture part of the increase in value for themselves. 
Under a leasehold system, however, the lessor Oandowner) owns the rights 
to any higher value use and the increased value that would result from a change 
in use. The way to collect such increased value is to collect betterment in full. If 
this is not done, the lessor is effectively subsidising changes in use by making a 
gift of part of the increase in value. If the lessor does collect full betterment, the 
nuuket value of leases will be their value for the use permitted under the lease 
because any buyer would know that a change in use can occur only after 
betterment has been paid. 
How should betterment be defined? 
Betterment under public ownership is the increase in ~e value of the 
u A more formal treatment of this section, together with tables illustrating the impacts of 
different definitions of betterment, may be found in the Appendix. 
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lease 26 in its present condition as a result of permission being given for a new 
use. The "before" value is simply the market value for the lease assuming that 
no change in use will be permitted for the duration of the lease. With full 
charging for betterment. the "before" value is the marlcet value of the lease. The 
"after'' value is the value of the lease with permission for the new use, or its 
value in the new use less the cost of any alterations, demolition and construction 
needed for the new use. 
Definition of betterment in Canbe"a under 1993 regulations 
As noted above, from September 1993 (September 1994 in Fyshwick), the 
before value is to be calculated on the assumptions "(a) that there are no 
improvements to or on the land comprising the lease; ... (c) ... that no variation 
of the lease would be agreed to during the remaining term of the lease.''27 This 
value is lower than under the definition above because it does not include the 
value of improvements to the site. The "after" value is the value of the site with 
permission for the new use. 
Consider first the situation where redevelopment is to occur so that the 
after value under the 1993 rules is quite close to the correct after value defined 
above (assuming that demolition costs are small). If valuations for betterment are 
accurate, the 1993 definition will produce an estimate of betterment that exceeds 
the increase in the value of the lease, and if the charge is set at 100 per cent of 
this value, no change of use will occur. This is because the before value does not 
26The value of a "property" or the value of a "lease" refers to the value of both the site and 
any buildings or other improvements to the site. The value of a "site" means the value of the 
land without improvements, but with roads, water, sewerage and other services provided. 
n Regulation 12(2) of 24 December 1993, under Paragraph 184(b) of the Land (Planning and 
Environment) Act 1992. 
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include the value of improvements for the existing use. This problem is less 
likely if the betterment charge is levied at less than 100 per cent. 
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Consider next a change in use where the existing buildings will be used for 
a new purpose, with or without alternations, rather than being demolished. An 
example would be where a house is to be used for a small business or where 
several floors are to be added to an existing office building. The 1993 rule will 
overstate bettemient if the improvements to the site are worth more for the 
existing than for the new use, which seems unlikely. If the reverse is the case, it 
will understate betterment 
At what rate should the betterment charge be set? 
A charge of 100 per cent of correctly defined betterment will not make any 
change in use, whether or not it involves redevelopment, unprofitable; i.e., if 
there is no betterment there is no charge. Anything less results in subsidisation of 
the change in use. A 100 per cent charge returns to the lessor the increase in the 
value of the lease which results from permission to use it for a more profitable 
purpose. This can be seen by comparing the cost of purchasing a greenfield site 
for a particular use at full marlcet value, and the cost of buying a redevelopment 
site at a cost, including betterment, which is less than its marlcet value by the 
amount that betterment is less than 100 per cent. 
There is no logical argument for treating the two assets-development 
rights on undeveloped land and increase in development rights on developed 
land--differently by selling one at a discount Selling a government-owned asset 
(the right to a more profitable use) at less than full marlcet value goes against a 
widely accepted criterion of accountability in the public sector. A 100 per cent 
charge will yield the same revenue to the government as purchasing the lease 
before the change of use at its marlcet value for the existing use, and auctioning it 
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with the new purpose clause. As noted above, a 100 per cent bettennent charge 
will also ensure that the market value of a lease is its value for the use pennitted 
in its purpose clause. 
To assert that a 100 per cent charge will make all redevelopment 
unprofitable is like saying that auctioning leases will make greenfield 
development unprofitable because it prevents developers from capturing the 
increase in the value of raw land when permission is given to use it for urban 
purposes. Since the cost of the lease including bettennent is defined as what a 
developer or a buyer who intended to use it for the new use would be prepared to 
pay for it, such a charge cannot make a change of use unprofitable. 
The development of greenfield sites: Palmerston case study 
Palmerston is the first of the suburbs of the new town of Gungahlin to be 
built (see Figures 2 and 3). As envisioned first in the 1970 Y-Plan, Gungahlin 
was to have had a population of 110,000. Since 1980, the target has been 
85,000. The NCDC's Draft Policy Plan for Gungahlin (1984) was the first of 
several planning studies describing goals for the new town. In 1987, the NCDC 
prepared an initial plan for Palmerston and proposed minimum housing targets. 
Also in 1987, however, the government decided to tum development over to the 
private sector. This was a major departure from prior practice throughout 
Canberra's history. As noted in the earlier discussion of joint ventures, it is a 
decision now under reconsideration by the ACT Government. 
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Figure 2. Canberra urbanb:ed area and location of study areas 
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Figure 3. Palmerston land use 
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We have chosen Palmerston as one of our two case studies for several 
reasons: (1) it is a realisation of current ACT policies for broadacre, or 
greenfield, sites; (2) it is being built as private ventures so that it is possible to 
compare the actual development patterns of the private sector with the public 
planning concepts; and (3) it offers the possibility of comparing the revenue 
obtained by the ACT from sale of leases to developers to that which might have 
been obtained had the ACT proceeded as a joint venturer, as it is increasingly 
choosing to do, or had it chosen to be the developer itself, as was the case until 
1988. 
Palmerston is located adjacent to the future Gungahlin town centre and 
overlooking Gungahlin Pond, the run-off retardation basin that has already been 
built, and its adjacent golf course, under construction in early 1994. 
Development policies 
1bere are four estates, or subdivisions, at Palmerston. The areas for the 
three estates auctioned in 1991 are, respectively: Gl, 45 hectares (111 acres); 
G2, 30 hectares (74 acres); and G3, 76 hectares (188 acres). The fourth estate, 
abutting the prospective town centre, is expected to be released in 1994, for 
medium density development, including apartments. Further planning objectives 
for this estate have yet to be published. 
One planning "goal" and one planning "requirement" were set forth in the 
prospectus for the first three estates (DELP, 1991) and have shaped what has 
been developed to date. The principal planning goal was to achieve higher 
residential densities than had prevailed in earlier new towns. Higher densities 
were thought to be less costly to service, as well as a means of achieving lower 
house prices. 1he planning requirement that strongly influenced development 
was the specification that no developer could be the successful bidder for more 
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than one of the three estates. 1bis might be seen as a political or an economic 
objective, avoiding possible monopolisation of development. 
The goal of higher residential density 
The initial auction aIUlouncement for Palmerston set minimwn and 
maximwn nwnbers of units for each of the four estates, with totals for all four of 
1,285, minimwn, and 1,885, maximum. The prospectus, however, subsequently 
was modified to state minima for G 1 of 395 units, for G2 of 245 units, and for 
G3 of735 units, totalling 1,375 units exclusive of G4, and to remove the 
maxima. Instead, an as-of-right authorisation to exceed the minima by 20 per 
cent was incorporated The prospectus further stated that a developer might 
build even more units, with no maximum stated or implied, if he could establish 
that the infrastructure as built or as he might alter it would be adequate for the 
number of units proposed Thus, it was DELP's intention to encourage 
developers to increase densities. 1bis policy was further promoted by leaving the 
mix and location of housing to the developers. In addition, collector streets and 
the verges--land between the street and the block sold to the home owner-are 
both much narrower than those in the older suburbs, and the verges have limited 
space for street trees. Since the site had very few existing trees and since there 
was no afforestation of the adjacent open spaces prior to development, the area is 
largely bare of trees and shrubs. There is little space available for them to be 
planted. 
All three developers were required to provide small playgrounds, the 
developer of G 1 was required to provide sites for the local shopping and 
community centres, and the developer of G3 was required to service 6.6 hectares 
(16.3 acres) and return it to the ACT for a primary school and playing field. 
The site plan suggested by the NCDC for Palmerston showed streets, lot 
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design, floodways, and the routing of an electricity transmission line. The maps 
published by DELP in 1991, with the bidding prospectus, bound the winning 
developers to the locations and, in some instances, the widths or areas of: 
• the floodways, incorporating cycle paths (2.5 metres/8.25 feet wide); 
• the major distributor street and its five access points from outside 
Palmerston; 
• the footpaths (1.2 metres/4 feet wide when adjacent to one side of the 
distributor street and its access points and 1.8 metres/6 feet wide as a 
separate walkway); 
• the local shopping centre and adjacent community facility (0.9 hectares/2.2 
acres minimum); 
• the primary school and its adjacent playing field (2.8 and 3.8 hectares/6.9 
and 9.4 acres, respectively); and 
• other, smaller playgrounds. 
Not specified were the locations of collector streets or houses; neither was there 
any directive on mix of housing types except that apartments were excluded. 
There are critics of the free hand given to developers at Palmerston and 
other suburbs now developing in Gungahlin. The chief planner for Land and 
National Development, the developer of G2, criticises the lack of overall 
planning by DELP for Gungahlin, believing that this leaves too much open to the 
winning bidder for each site. 28 Some may do a good job, some may not. 
The requirement for three deve"lopers 
The specification that a different developer be responsible for each of the 
"'Interview with Tony Carey, Chief Planner, Land and National Development Corporation, 
7 February 1994. 
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estates to be built was intended to encourage a variety of housing price and 
choice. It also prevented any one developer from having a monopoly on sites in 
Palmerston. There were multiple bidders for each of the estates, with the largest, 
G3, auctioned first and attracting the most interest. The winners did, indeed, 
represent different development preferences. MBA Land and its joint venture 
partner, Consolidated Builders, operating as Canberra Land, successful bidders 
for the G3 site, customarily develop small blocks primarily for first-time home 
buyers. The winners of sites Gl and G2, Landco Pty Ud and Land and National 
Development Corporation, favour development of larger blocks targeted at 
second- or third-time buyers. 
Developers' choices 
The winning developers jointly carried out a study to justify development 
at densities higher than the automatically approved 20 per cent above the 
minimum. Since the Commonwealth and ACT Governments are both pressing 
for higher densities, DELP approved the developers' request. There was no 
specification of the maximum number of units that could be built. 29 
In February 1994, DELP anticipated that there would be at least 1,715 
units when the first three estates of Palmerston were completed. Our field 
observations, in February 1994, and government records obtained later, 
suggested that the total would be much higher, close to 1,925, or about 40 per 
cent above the required minimum. Table 3 gives the housing types and block 
sizes as defined by DELP, as well as our counts and the average prices per 
block. Although our field observations are approximations, they are consistent 
with government records of property sales. 
29 Interviews with Hans Sommer, 9 February and 11 March 1994. 
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Table 3. Block types and sizes, numbers of dwellings and prices, 
Palmerston 
Block type 
Standard density 
Cottage 
Courtyard 
Medium density 
Dual occupancy 
Cluster 
Block size (square 
metres) 
630plus 
465 to630 
3(i() to 465 
300 to 465 
325 plus (per dwelling) 
Strata-titled housing at 
higher densities 
Number of 
dwellings 
812 
64 
158 
196 
42 
653 
Average price per 
block of land ($A) 
66,475 
50,609 
43,595 
44,278 
33,474 
30,474 
Note: At some point, DELP redefined the break point between standard and cottage; 
formerly it was at 730 square metres, now it is at 630, thus including within the 
standard definition lots up to 100 square metres smaller than was previously the case. 
The lot sizes exclude verges. "Strata-titled" is equivalent to "condominium". 
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Landco, on site G l, had a minimum requirement of 395 units. We 
estimate a total of 554 units, or 40 per cent higher than the minimum. Landco's 
development is 50 per cent standard density housing, 30 per cent separate 
housing on smaller blocks, and 20 per cent cluster housing. The denser housing 
is located adjacent to what will be the G4 medium-density estate and the 
Pahnerston commercial centre. 
Land and National Development chose to develop most of its estate as 
standard residential blocks. We estimate a total of 302 houses, or 23 per cent in 
excess of the minimum of 245 units. Of this total, 83 per cent are standard 
blocks and 17 per cent are cluster housing. Land and National Development was 
the first of the three developers to get its plans approved and sold many of its 
blocks off the plan. They assumed that 800 square metre blocks would attract 
buyers, particularly people living in the closest new town, Belconnen, who were 
looking for a larger home, and this proved to be so. Most of the purchasers were 
second-, third-, and even fourth-time home buyers of middle income. The 800 
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square metre blocks sold for up to $86,500. 30 The townhouses in 02 are located 
adjacent to a floodway and cycle path. 
Canberra Land, as anticipated, chose to develop predominantly smaller 
blocks. It has exceeded the minimum for its site by 45 per cent. The minimum 
was 735 units; we estimate a total of 1,069. The mix is 27 per cent standard 
blocks, 23 per cent separate houses on smaller blocks, and 50 per cent dual 
occupancy and cluster housing. The denser housing types have been located near 
the local shopping centre, school, and playing field, and near Gungahlin and 
Nudurr Drives, two of the exterior roads that bound Palmerston. 
An evaluation of Palmerston 
It is indisputable that DELP achieved its goal and requirment of higher 
density and multiple developers at Palmerston. Does that mean that the planning 
was excellent and that Palmerston provided the ACT with a reasonable return for 
conversion of a broadacre site? 
Planning issues 
As to the first question, there is considerable dissatisfaction with what has 
been built. We cite, first, as a critic, Bill Wood, ACT Minister for Environment, 
Land and Planning. Commenting on the ACT's prospective joint venture in 
Gungahlin at Ngunnawal, he said that he wished the Planning Authority to have 
. enough time in the future to avoid the risk of the ''poor design and siting 
experienced in Palmerston, where some developments were unsightly and badly 
planned."31 These sentiments are a response to the relatively crowded character 
'"Based on data collected by DELP. 
31 Canbe"a Tim£s, 1April1993. 
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of development at Palmerston, with narrow streets and verges, little open space, 
and very closely spaced houses. Generally, the appearance of Palmerston 
suggests that little attention was given to public spaces, or to the relationships 
among individual buildings. 
Barbara Norman, President of the Royal Australian Planning fustitute 
(ACT Division), commented: 
... under principles established by the first commissioner of the National 
Capital Development Commission, Sir John Overall, and former chief 
planner Peter Harrison, Canberra suburbs had no fences, wide streets, 
footpaths, and local shops with community facilities. I went to Gungahlin . 
. . and I was not entirely convinced that those standards have been 
maintained. . . . Canberra is considered as a model of residential planning 
design and I'm convinced that some of those earlier planning principles are 
be. ded 32 mg ero . 
One possible comparison is with the planning and development by Land 
and National Development at Jerrabomberra, a 600 hectare project in New South 
Wales, adjacent to Queanbeyan.33 Its 1993 population had reached 3,000, and 
its population at completion will be between 12,000 and 15,000, in the range of 
double that of Palmerston once the G4 site is completed. The land price and site 
development costs are comparable. The question that we posed is whether the 
development at Jerrabomberra is better than that at Pahnerston-which we think 
that it is-and why this may be. This is a subjective judgment; however, we 
offer several objective observations in support of our conclusion. 
'
2 Canberra Times, 15 December 1993. 
33 This could eventuiiny be pan of the joint ACT-NSW new town of the same name, described 
earlier. 
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First. there was careful, cooperative planning. During the planning phase, 
the Land and National Development planning team met regularly with the 
Queanbeyan planners and Council. This provided a forum for continual 
exchange of views and modification of plans, and the process led to an outcome 
of which both Land and National Development and Queanbeyan are proud. 34 
There was no comparable process in the planning of Palmerston. 
Second, two stages of the Jerrabomberra development have won the 
Housing Industry Association's Housing Estate of the Year Award for the ACT 
region. 
Third is the test of the market. Jerrabomberra is considerably further from 
Civic than Palmerston and is located in what has been less fashionable 
Queanbeyan. Brian Hill, who was a member of the planning team for Land and 
National Development at both locations, reported that the initial sales prices of 
standard blocks in Palmerston were 100 per cent higher than the same company's 
sales of similar blocks in Jerrabomberra-$70,000 compared to $35,000. In 
early 1994, the few remaining comparable blocks in Palmerston were selling at 
$86,500, compared to $80,000 at Jerrabomberra, indicating a substantial relative 
jump in the perceived attractiveness of Jerrabomberra. 
Financial returns 
To assess the likely returns to the ACT Government from its desired 
resumption of a greater role in land development, we have estimated the financial 
return to the Government from participating in the development of Palmerston in 
joint ventures with private partners, and from carrying out the development itself, 
compared with the returns it received from private development. The following 
"'Interviews with Tony Carey, 7 February 1994, and Bob Ogilvy, Director of Planning for 
Queanbeyan, 7 February 1994. 
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assumptions relate to the joint venture alternative and are laid down in ACT 
Government policies for joint ventures: 
53 
• The ACT Government's share of before-tax profit of a joint venture is 50 
per cent, the minimum required in the Government's other joint venture 
agreements. 
• Under the joint venture arrangements, the Government receives both its 
profit share and its payment of the amount bid by the joint venturer at the 
time leases for individual serviced blocks are issued. For convenience, it 
is assumed that this date and the date the joint venture declares and 
distributes its profit share dividends are the sale dates listed below. Tiris 
detennines the timing of the flow of revenue to the government from both 
the joint venture and from government development. 
• The premium bid by the private partner in the joint venture for land is 
escalated at an appropriate rate, assumed to be 5 per cent per year, until 
the date at which the government receives its payment. The total premium 
bid by a joint venturer is assumed to be a payment for land. 
The following additional assumptions were decided after discussion with the 
35 Land Development Branch of DELP: 
• The ACT Government provides major infrastructure in all three kinds of 
development. 
• The premium offered for the site for a joint venture would be $16 million 
compared with the $19 .6 million paid for private development. 
• That, in accord with the requirements of the Government, 10 per cent of 
the premium paid by the private developers was paid on the day of the 
"We acknowledge the provision of information, none of which was "commercial-in-
confidencc", by the Land Development Branch. 
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auction and the remainder 36 days later. The value at the date of the 
auction was $19.43 million with a 10 per cent discount rate and $19.37 
million with a 13 per cent rate. 
• The suburb would be developed with three joint ventures with different 
developers, just as there were three different private developers for the 
three parts of the suburb. 
• Each of the joint ventures develops its land in stages of 175 dwelling sites. 
As noted, the total number of 1,925 dwelling sites was obtained from ACT 
Government records confirmed by field visits. The timing allows nine 
months for all planning to be completed and permits obtained. After that, 
two alternative assumptions are made about the timing of releases of 
serviced blocks. If the market is buoyant, it is assumed that one stage will 
be released by each joint venture each 6 months; if it is less buoyant, each 
9 months. 
36 
It is assumed that, on average, the blocks will be sold one 
month after completion, which takes account of the fact that some blocks 
will be sold off the plan before individual titles are available. The returns 
from sales of blocks, on these assumptions, occur on average at the 
following times for 6-monthly stages; the times for 9-monthly stages are 
shown in brackets: 
525 sites 16 (19) months after the agreement was signed; 
525 sites 22 (28) months after the agreement was signed; 
525 sites 28 (37) months after the agreement was signed; and 
350 sites 34 ( 46) months after the agreement was signed. 
• The cost to the developer of servicing and subdivision, including 
management and borrowing costs, is $25,000 per dwelling, averaged ovei: 
36 These assumptions are both conservative, as the Palmerston blocks sold more quickly. 
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different kinds of dwellings. It is quite possible that private developers 
were able to produce serviced lots 10 to 15 per cent more cheaply than the 
government because of greater efficiency and shorter holding periods 
before sale. This has been considered as one option in the calculations. 
• Selling costs are 4.5 per cent of the prices at which allotments are sold. 
• Gross revenue from the sale of allotments is assumed to be the same for 
joint venture and government development as it was with private 
development. This information was obtained from the ACT Government's 
records of sales, with a few missing prices estimated from prices of 
adjacent leases. 
• The rate at which future revenue is discounted takes two alternative 
values. The first is 10 per cent, which is approximately the Government's 
borrowing rate, and the second is 13 per cent, which adds a 3 per cent risk 
factor. The results give an indication of their sensitivity to different 
discount rates. 
For each of the two alternatives to private development being 
considered-joint ventures and government development-two sets of 
calculations were carried out. The first estimates the present value at the date of 
auction of the flow of funds that would have been received by the ACT 
Government from a joint venture arrangement and from carrying out the 
development itself. These can then be compared with the present value of the 
prices bid by the private developers: $19.43 and $19.37 million with 10 and 13 
per cent discount rates, respectively. The second evaluates the internal rate of 
return from a decision to forgo the returns from private development-a loss of 
$1.96 million immediately and $17.64 million one month later-and a gain of the 
flow of returns from the joint venture on the titpetable set out above, or the total 
estimated net returns on the same timetable. 
56 
Bourassa, Neutze & Strong 
The first step in the calculation was to total the gross revenue from block 
sales ($94.089 million, or an average of $48,877 per dwelling) from which is 
deducted selling costs of 4.5 per cent, development costs of $25,000 per 
dwelling, and land costs of $16 million, leaving net profit per dwelling of 
$13,366, of which the ACT Government gets half in a joint venture. The $16 
million, appreciated at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, is added to the returns to 
the Government. Where it develops the land itself, it receives the total value of 
$21,678 per dwelling: $16 million bid for the land ($8,312 per dwelling) plus the 
profit of $13,366 per dwelling. All of these returns accrue to the Government in 
proportion to the number of blocks sold in each stage according to the above 
schedule. The results are shown in Table 4. 
It is clear that, on the assumptions set out above, joint ventures would be a 
very good investment for the ACT Government, and carrying out alone the 
development of Palmerston would have been an even better investment. 
Compared with the (discounted) return of a little under $19.5 million that it 
received from the auction, the Government would have received $22.5 million 
from a joint venture arrangement on the conservative assumption of 9-monthly 
stages and a 13 per cent discount rate, and up to $25.1 million with 6-monthly 
stages and a 10 per cent discount rate. Because the period of investment is 
relatively short, the internal rate of return is over 20 per cent on either 
assumption. Returns from development by the Government alone on the same 
Table 4. Returns to ACT Government from alternatives to private development 
Joint venture• Government 
development 
Common development Lower private costs 
costs 
Discount 6-monthly 9-monthly 6-monthly 9-monthly 6-monthly 
rate stages stages stages stages stages 
Net present 10% $25.lm $24.2m $27.lm $26.0m $34.5m 
value 13% $23.8m $22.5m $25.7m $24.3m $32.7m 
Internal rate 27.4% 21.1% 38.3% 28.9% 52.2% 
of return 
9-monthly 
stages 
$32.6m 
$30.5m 
38.0% 
Private 
development 
$19.43m 
$19.37m 
*Common development costs assumes $25,000 per dwelling for all developments; lower private costs assumes that private 
development and joint venture costs are 10% cheaper. 
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. high 37 assumptions are even er. 
Varying the assumptions so that private and joint venture costs are lower 
than government costs reduces the margin between returns from joint ventures 
and those from government development. It has no effect on the comparison 
between private and government development because the return from private 
development is solely the revenue from the premium bid for the site. It improves 
the return from joint venture relative to private development as joint ventures 
become somewhat more profitable. 
These results must be qualified in several ways, not least of which is the 
fact that Palmerston was a very profitable development because of the pent-up 
demand for housing on the north side of Canberra. The development may also 
have been more profitable than was anticipated at the time of auction because 
developers were pennitted to provide sites for a significantly larger number of 
dwellings than might have been expected 
No allowance has been made for the additional administrative costs to the 
ACT Government of participation in the joint ventures and of monitoring the 
operation to ensure that the profits of the joint ventures are not siphoned off 
through inflated development costs. These additional administrative costs are 
likely to be very small relative to the revenues. 
Most obviously, joint ventures are financially more risky for the ACT 
37 An alternative for a joint venture in which the Government was a partner would have been to 
reduce the prices at which it sold serviced blocks to the public. Were the Government as 
developer to sell land in the same way, at fixed prices through agents, it could have done the 
same. That would have resulted in faster sales, but even without any change in the 6-monthly 
stages assumption, prices could have been reduced by $3,000 under a joint venture or by 
$9,000 (to an average of just over $40,000) if the Government had carried out the 
development alone, and still would have been marginally better off than with private 
development To sustain such lower prices while selling at auction would have required a 
somewhat faster rate of production. 
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Government than selling holding leases to private developers, and the additional 
returns are in some respect a (generous) return for the additional risk. 
Change of use for previously developed sites: Braddon case study 
The purpose of this section is to provide a critical review of change of use 
and bettetnlent capture under self-government in one of Canberra's suburbs.38 
Braddon is a good case study because its proximity to the city centre means that 
it is particularly subject to redevelopment pressure and its diversity of land use 
means that many different types of reuse and redevelopment have occurred. 
Although the ACT Government was not established until 1989, we have 
identified all approved applications for variations from 1988 through 1993, in 
order to include projects that were in the pipeline as self-government was being 
implemented. These are listed by method of betterment calculation and then by 
section and block numbers in Table 5, which reports a number of details and 
summary statistics for the 30 variations. 
Located adjacent to Civic (the city centre), Braddon is one of Canberra's 
oldest suburbs. A map of streets and buildings drawn in 1933 shows that much 
of the residential area designated standard residential in Figure 4 was already 
developed and that there was also some development in the commercial areas 
just north of Civic. Today Braddon encompasses a wide range of uses, 
including: commercial and light industrial uses immediately north of the city 
centre; hotels, office buildings, and medium- and high-density residential uses 
along its western and south-eastern boundaries; parks and recreation facilities; 
31 A number of case studies of specific redevelopment projects prior to self-government are 
discussed in Ncutzc (1988a). 
Table 5. Actual and correct betterment fees, Braddon, 1988-1993 
After LllDd me Before valuea 
Section Blocl< Demolldmi me dlltrlct LllDd lmprovementa 
MltluMA 
IS 
18 
19 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
24 
28 
2 
I 
8 
2 
4 
s 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
11 
17 
19 
17 
14 
29 I 
29 20 
M1lluHIAS!l!!!!!!!!l 
Maltotl B 
18 
19 
21 19 
29 2 
29 14 
29 20 
M1""'4BS__,, 
v .. 
No 
v .. 
v .. 
Yea 
v .. 
No 
v .. 
v .. 
v .. 
v .. 
v .. 
No 
No 
v .. 
No 
v .. 
No 
No 
No 
No 
v .. 
No 
v .. 
R 
c 
R 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
R 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
RR 9S,OOO 
c 806,000 
c 1,600,000 
c 200,000 
c 200,000 
c 150,000 
c 180,000 
c 200,000 
c 200,000 
c 200,000 
c 200,000 
c 200,000 
c 11S,OOO 
c 11S,000 
SR 200,000 
c 820,000 
c 190,000 
c 1,330,000 
c l,S00,000 
c 1,250,000 
C 77S,OOO 
c 200,000 
c 1,000,000 
c 1,330,000 
SS.OOO I 1S,000 
1,296,000 
3,491,000 S,062,000 
80,000 29S,000 
36S,OOO 
55,000 390,000 
139,000 233,000 
SO.OOO 380,000 
44,000 380,000 
45,000 380,000 
4S,OOO 39S,000 
SS.OOO 400,000 
77S,000 
77S,000 
20S,000 SS0,000 
63S,000 865,000 
60,000 661,000 
1,330,000 
1,S00,000 
1,250,000 
77S,000 
3S,000 S9S,OOO 
1,000,000 
20,000 1,410,000 
Adu81 beUerment Method Correct Actul u a Method Du a 
D tee tee• at cwrect fee• or correct fee N-
25,000 12,SOO 80,000 25,000 
490,000 174,000 490,000 490,000 
-3S,000 0 1,731,000 140,000 
15,000 6,000 9S,000 IS,000 
16S,000 
185,000 
139,000 53,000 
130,000 
136,000 
81,000 
91,000 
2S,OOO 
63,SOO 
66,SOO 
16S,000 16S,OOO 
240,000 18S,000 
S3,000 S3,000 
180,000 130,000 
180,000 136,000 
I 3S,000 66,000 180,000 I 3S,OOO 
150,000 73,SOO 19S,000 IS0,000 
14S,000 
0 
0 
14S,000 
71,000 200,000 14S,OOO 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
72,SOO I 7S,000 14S,000 
635,000 4S,000 21,000 4S,OOO 4S,000 
411,000 204,000 471,000 411,000 
0 0 0 0 
2J9$,000 1.011,$00 4.480,(}(/(J 1.370.000 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
360,000 178,SOO 39S,OOO 360,000 
0 0 0 0 
60,000 28,SOO 80,000 60,000 
410,000 107,000 '1S,OllO ao,ooo 
so.o 
3S.S 
0.0 
40.0 
49.1 
49.2 
47.2 
48.8 
48.9 
48.9 
49.0 
49.0 
100.0 
100.0 
50.0 
46.7 
49.6 
100.0 
'3.4 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
49.6 
100.0 
41.5 
49.J 
320.0 
100.0. 
1236.4 b 
633.3 
100.0 
129.7 
100.0 
138.S 
132.4 
133.3 
130.0 
137.9 
100.0 c 
100.0c 
120.7 
100.0 
114.6 
100.0 c 
189.0 
100.0 c 
100.0 c 
100.0 c 
109.7 
100.0c 
133.3 d 
113.1 
(cmtinued on neJtt pqe) 
Table S {continued}. Actual and correct betterment fees1 Braddon1 1988-1993 
After Lmd- Btlan•aluoo Afternlua Aclwllbeaerment Method Carnet Actulua MotbodD u a Sectlcm Block Demolltlcm 
-
dbtrict Land 1-'onmentl Luci lmpoot<med• A- Fee Dree , .... .,_, .... .,_, .. 
M1IAotlC 
8 No c c 2,800,000 2,800,000 0 0 0 0 100.0 100.0 c 
28 IS No c c 77S,000 77S,000 0 0 0 0 100.0 100.0 c 
29 IS No c c 82S,000 84S,OOO 20,000 10,000 20,000 20,000 so.o 100.0 
29 20 No c c l ,!S0,000 l ,IS0,000 0 0 0 0 100.0 100.0 c 
58 7 Yes R RR 305,000 320,000 !S,000 7,SOO 100,000 120,000 6.3 83.3 e 
M11/fodcs_,, JS.OOO 17,SOO 110,000 1#,IJOO 11.S 85.7 
M1IAotlD 
28 No c c 143,150 178,150 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 100.0 100.0 
M11Md D s_,, 35,000 35,000 35.000 35,IJOO 100.0 100.0 
AU M1tltob s • ..,,,,,,, l,685,000 1,l87,000 5,110,000 l,965,000 43.4 17l.3 
Sourcu: 
Australian Valuation Office IJld Deplllment of P.nvironment, Land and Pluming records, and authors' calculations. 
Notu: 
(a) Calculation of the actual betterment fee included a $71,000 deduction for parking. 
(b) This "conect fee" is bued on the Australian Valuation Office's original valuaticn forbetlmnent pwposes (subsequently changed due to an appeal to the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal). 
(c) In cuea involving no change in value (ICCOrding to lhe AVO's calculation), we have defined the actual and method D fees to be 100% of lhe correct fee. 
(d) The $20,000 "before" improvements value is the cost of demolition. 
(e) The "correct fee" calculation assumes that lhe correct before value (excluding potential) was $200,000 ($120,000 assessed land value plus $80,000 improvements). 
Key: 
Method: See Table 2. 
After use: 
C = ccmmacial 
R = residential 
Land use district: 
C = commercial/office 
RR = medium-demity residential redevelopment 
SR = standard residential 
Notes 
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low- and medium- density detached and semi-detached houses; and community 
facilities such as schools, churches, and a community arts centre. The residential 
streets are generally lined with wide verges, or "nature strips", that accommodate 
mature trees. The older residential areas of Braddon generally have larger lots 
than the newer ones, averaging 1,119 and 850 square metres (about one-quarter 
and one-fifth acres), respectively.39 
Variations to lease purpose clauses 
The Territory Plan, approved in late 1993, places all of the newer 
residential sections and one of the older sections in a district where medium-
density residential redevelopment is encouraged.
40 
1be new development can 
have a maximum of three storeys, and will generally be in the form of flats or 
townhouses. Redevelopment proposals are subject to the ACT's Design and 
Siting Code. Although a couple of applications had been made by early 1994, no 
variations had been granted pending resolution of negotiations regarding the 
design of the proposed buildings. Previously, three sites in the redevelopment 
and standard residential districts had been redeveloped under an NCDC 
regulation encouraging the development of"Aged Persons' Units" (APUs).41 
Three applications for APU projects were submitted and approved during our 
study period. Only one other variation for a residential use was approved; this 
was for a large apartment building, St James Court, at the south-western comer 
of Braddon, immediately adjacent to Civic and the main north-south arterial, 
19 These lot sizes are exclusive of the verge. 
40 A "section" is usually a group of adjoining parcels of land enclosed by streets-what would 
be known as a "block" in the US. 
••These were Section 15 Block 2, Section 24 Block 17, and Section 58 Block 7 (see Table 5 
for further details). 
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Figure 4. Braddon land use 
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All of the other variations have been for new commercial uses. Eleven of 
these have been along Torrens Street, which marks the eastern border of the 
commercial/office district at the south-western comer of Figure 4. This district, 
established by the recent Territory Plan, essentially fonnalises what was already 
occurring along Torrens Street: houses with residential lease pwpose clauses 
were being used for commercial pwposes. It allows small-scale office buildings, 
community facilities, and residential uses. Buildings may not exceed two stories, 
and the maximum plot ratios are 0.4:1or0.5:1. 
Most of the remaining 15 variations involved relatively minor changes in 
use of existing commercial buildings in the commercial district immediately north 
of Civic, and incurred no betterment fees. The most notable exception to this 
was the expansion of a hotel, from 48 to 81 rooms, which incurred a betterment 
fee of $174,000. 
The strange case of St James Court 
One of the variations was particularly anomalous. The variation for 
Section 19 Block 8 involved the replacement of a high-rise motel, the 
Travelodge, by a high-rise apartment building, known as St James Court, with a 
much larger plot ratio. The application for variation was submitted just prior to 
the February 1990 change in regulations, so that Method A was used for the 
calculation of before and after values. This meant that the before value was to 
include land and improvements assuming no variation in lease pwpose, and the 
after value was to include land only because the existing improvements were to 
be demolished. Under Method A, betterment was charged at a rate of half the . 
42 Section 19 Block 8. 
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increase in value, less $1,500. In its initial calculation, the Australian Valuation 
Office determined that the before value was $5,100,000, including $1,600,000 
for land and $3,500,000 for improvements (including demolition costs), and that 
the after value was $5,240,000 for the land only. Consequently, the applicant 
was charged a fee of $68,500. On appeal to the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal, the developer challenged some technical details of the bettennent 
calculations. Subsequently, the after value was reduced to $35,000 less than the 
before value, and no fee was charged. 
The revised valuations were clearly in error, because no developer would 
undertake such a project. According to the revised valuation, the new lease 
would be worth less to the developer than the old one; this is patently ludicrous. 
Assuming that the original before and after valuations were correct, the 
betterment fee should have been $140,000. 
Potential adverse effects of current betterment policy 
In addition to showing the actual bettennent fee charged, Table 5 also 
gives the correct fee and the fee that would have.been charged had the current 
Method D been applied. In fact, with the valuations in the table, 13 of the 
projects might not have been carried out under Method D because the betterment 
fee would have exceeded the actual amount of betterment. Each of these 13 
projects involved demolition and redevelopment with a more intensive use. 
Because such changes can be accompanied by relatively large increases in land 
value, Method D is particularly biased against them. The most dramatic instance 
of this is the St James Court redevelopment (Section 19 Block 8), which would 
have incurred a $1,731,000 betterment fee under the current regulations, over 12 
times the assumed correct fee of $140,000. In total, the Method D fees would 
have been 1. 7 times the correct fees. 
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The redevelopment district 
The designation of a residential redevelopment district was foreshadowed 
in the Draft Territory Plan, released for public discussion in October 1991. The 
designation reflects the government's decision to direct 50 per cent of residential 
development to infill and redevelopment sites. It might be thought that 
anticipated redevelopment would have been reflected in greater land value 
increases in that district than in the standard residential district because the 
betterment fee has been less than 100 per cent of betterment and because 
valuations may understate betterment; however, increments in assessed land 
values have been uniform across these areas, rising 18 per cent in nominal terms 
in both districts between the January 1992 and January 1993 valuations, 65 per 
cent between January 1991 and January 1993, and 87 per cent between January 
1988 and January 1993. As of January 1993, land values averaged $104,500 per 
lot in the redevelopment district, and $147,800 in the standard residential district 
(where lots are larger). These findings give no evidence for the hypothesis that 
some redevelopment potential might have been capitalised in the redevelopment 
district after release of the draft plan. 
As noted previously, no variations for redevelopment had been approved 
by early 1994 under the redevelopment provisions of the new Territory Plan. 
Two proposals were under consideration, however. The first proposal involved 
Blocks 6 through 9 of Section 22. Two of the four blocks are owned by the ACT 
Housing Trust and two by Bobundra Pty Ltd, a developer; this project was to 
have been subsidised by the Australian government's Building Better Cities 
program, as an example of good medium-density redevelopment The existing 
four houses would be demolished to make way for 34 flats; a conditional 
variation for this pwpose was approved in early 1993. The project was then the 
subject of an inquiry (the ''Todd Report") into whether improper approval and 
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subsequent review procedures were followed --particularly provisions denying 
third party appeals---and was also the subject of substantial local complaint about 
poor design, including poor solar orientation, above ground parking, and the 
decision to put all units in one structure. The Housing Trust and Bobundra 
subsequently sought to add two more blocks to the project, and went through a 
further lease variation process to consolidate the six blocks, with the aim of 
achieving better design and siting for the development.43 
The Dicksons, owners of a block on the comer of Torrens and 
Girrahween, and adjacent to the above blocks, sought to appeal the ACT 
decision to approve the variation, but were prevented from doing so by the Land, 
Environment and Planning Act. They then sold their 1920s house to a developer, 
as did the two adjoining owners on Girrahween. According to the Dicksons, the 
developer insisted on "a joint contemporaneous settlement" and paid raw land 
prices.
44 
Records maintained by the Australian Valuation Office indicate that the 
three lots sold for a total of $1,600,000. This project, too, has been stalled over 
negotiations about design and siting, but demolition occurred in March 1994. 
Developers have been approaching home owners in Braddon's 
redevelopment district, urging them to sell. This activity was reflected in the 
attempted auction, in February 1994, of two parcels located in Section 13. The 
first of these parcels consisted of eight contiguous lots auctioned as one unit; the 
second parcel consisted of one separate lot auctioned by itself. Neither of the 
parcels reached its reserve price. In subsequent discussions with the real estate 
agent responsible for the auction, betterment fees--and in particular the recent 
"Interview with Moiya Haynes, Assistant Secretary, Lease Administration Branch, DELP, 
16 February 1994. 
44 Canbe"a Times, 28 March 1993. 
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changes to the method for calculating fee&--Were blamed for the failure to reach 
an acceptable price. 
Some details regarding the two Section 13 parcels are shown in Table 6. 
The most interesting conclusion to be drawn from this table is the fact that the 
actual betterment fee under Method D, had the properties sold at the highest bids, 
would have been substantially less than the correct betterment fee. Thus it is 
incorrect to say that the betterment fee is prohibiting redevelopment Instead, the 
reserve price was simply set too high. 
An evaluation of betterment policy 
Although we are unable to comment on the costs and benefits of the ACT 
Government's redevelopment policy as it applies to Braddon. this case study 
clearly suggests some conclusions regarding bettennent. 
First, the current definition of betterment is strongly biased against 
redevelopment for new commercial uses. Nearly half of all changes in use and 
almost all of the redevelopment projects that took place from 1988 through 1993 
would likely not have occurred had the current Method D been applied 
throughout that period. 
Second, although the definition of betterment was correct until February 
1990, the valuations were often changed on appeal, resulting in no betterment 
being charged. One-third of all changes incurred no fee and, in one case, St 
James Court, the after value was determined to be less than the before value. 
Cases such as this violate the logic of land use succession, which is that property 
owners will seek to change the use of property only when the property is worth 
more in the new use than the old use. 
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Table 6. Alternative betterment fees for auctioned properties, Section 
13,Braddon 
Eight lots AU lots 
combined (a) Sing!e lot (b) combined 
Highest bid (c) 2,900,000 325,000 3,225,000 
Unimproved valuations 747,000 104,000 851,000 
Estimated improvements (d) 640,000 80,000 720,000 
Method D betterment 2,153,000 221,000 2,374,000 
MethodD fee 1,076,500 110,500 1,187,000 
Correct betterment and[ee (e) 1,513,000 141,000 1,654,000 
Notes: 
(a) Section 13 Blocks 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 19 and 20. 
(b) Section 13 Block 10. 
(c) The properties were passed in for negotiation because these bids did not meet the 
reseive prices. 
(d) Assumes that improvements were worth $80,000 per lot 
( e) Assumes negligible demolition costs. 
Policy recommendations 
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Two sets of policy recommendations follow directly from our analysis of 
the Canberra leasehold system. In regard to greenfield development, we endorse 
the ACT Government's goal of playing a greater role in the site planning and 
land development process. This could achieve two objectives: higher quality 
living environments and a greater realisation of bettennent from greenfield 
development In regard to reuse and redevelopment of previously developed 
sites, we recommend that the definition of bettennent be changed to capture 
appropriately the increase in property value due to changes ~ lease purpose. 
Also, betterment should be charged at a rate of 100 per cent; subsidies to 
encourage more efficient use of infrastructure in inner areas should be made in a 
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much more direct and open form than remission of betterment fees. 
Greenfield development 
The ACT Government's current commitment to joint venture development 
and announced intention in the 1994/95 budeget to resume public development 
are founded on two objectives that we endorse: higher quality living 
environments and greater capture by the Government of bettennent which occurs 
when non-urban land is converted to urban use. 
1be role of the ACT Government in influencing the quality of development 
in Palmerston, and in the newer suburbs of Tuggeranong, gives no great cause for 
confidence that its greater involvement per se will improve the quality of living 
environments. In Palmerston, small allotments, narrow streets and verges, 
limited local open space, and a high proportion of medium density housing, 
combined with inadequate attention to design, have produced a low quality of 
development. Much of this must be seen as an outcome of Government policy 
that did not set a maximum number of dwellings or exercise sufficient control 
over design and appeared to be concerned mainly to economise on the cost of its 
investment in infrastructure. 
There is some room for optimism from the adoption of the ACT Code for 
Residential Development, for which the Department of Environment, Land and 
Planning received an award from the Royal Australian Planning Institute (ACT 
Division) in 1993. The new code incorporates a well-articulated statement of 
objectives, design alternatives, performance criteria, and measures for planning 
and subdivision, building design and siting, private and public open space, 
streetscapes and landscapes, transport and streets, and physical services. It can 
be expected to enhance the quality of future development. The code was 
developed to some extent as a reaction to the kind of development that has 
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occuned in Palmerston. Despite its adoption, it is not mandatory since it is not 
incorporated in legislation. 
On the basis of our analysis, it is clear that it would be to the financial 
advantage of the ACT Government and the people of the ACT for the 
Government to resume the role that it took in land development prior to 1989. 
Since it already effectively owns all of the developable land, there seem to be no 
major barriers to it doing so. 
Change of use 
The current method of calculating betterment (what we have called 
Method D) equates it to the increase in the value of the site only. This results in 
the correct betterment fee where no redevelopment occurs only when the change 
in use does not affect the value that the existing improvements add to the site (an 
unlikely situation); otherwise, the fee charged will not be correct. Moreover, 
Method D will not result in the correct betterment fee where redevelopment does 
occur unless the value of the existing improvements for their current use and the 
cost of their demolition are both negligible. Basing the betterment fee on the 
increase in value of the entire property--i.e., the lease-is the correct alternative 
and, in this respect, involves a return to Method A. The before value should be 
the total value of the property in its current use and its current condition, 
assuming no change to the lease purpose clause. The after value should be the 
total value of the property in its current condition for its new use, i.e., ignoring 
the costs of demolition and new construction, if any. The correct method would 
gain for the Government the same revenue as it would receive if it purchased the 
leases of properties to be redeveloped at their market prices (given their current 
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lease purpose clauses) and auctioned them for redevelopment.45 
The correct definitions of before and after values follow directly from an 
understanding of land use succession in a private market. Changes occur only 
when, in its current condition, a property's value for its new use is greater than 
its value in its current use. This means that each change in use is associated with 
a change in value. In a private market, the increase in value may be divided 
between the previous property owner and the developer. With public leasehold, 
it all belongs to the government and hence it is incumbent on the government to 
set fees to equal the increment in property value that results from granting 
permission for a change of use. 
Although the current method of assessing betterment is incorrect, it must 
be admitted that the increase in site value is a somewhat appealing base because 
the betterment that results from a change in use accrues mainly to the site. 
Nevertheless, a charge of 100 per cent of this definition of bettennent will make 
unprofitable many changes of use that would have been profitable without the 
charge. Such a charge is inefficient, because it gives the wrong signals to 
property developers. 
The changes that need to be made to the present regulations to provide a 
correct base are to delete subsection 12(2)(a), which refers to site value, and add 
some language clarifying the method for calculating the after value. The 
definition would then read: 
"added value", in relation to a lease to which a variation is proposed, 
means the amount by which the value of the lease immediately after the 
variation exceeds the value of the lease immediately before the variation, it 
45 Tiris latter procedure would overcome the problems that seem to arise in setting appropriate 
values for betterment. Also, it would enable the Government to play a more active role in 
redevelopment. Its main disadvantage is that it would be politically unpopular. 
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being assumed: (a) that the rent payable throughout the term of the lease is 
a nominal rent; and (b) in relation to the value of the lease immediately 
before the variation-that no variations of the lease would be agreed to 
during the remaining term of the lease. The value of the lease after the 
change in permitted use should be calculated assuming that the same 
improvements are in place as in the before calculation. If these 
improvements are to be demolished, then their after value will be negative, 
due to the cost of demolition. 
We recommend that, if the ACT Government wishes to subsidise 
redevelopment, it do so directly rather than through concessional betterment 
charges. The current policy of remission of 50 per cent of betterment fees for 
residential redevelopment bears at best only a crude relationship to any benefit 
that might be attributable to urban consolidation. This would be an equitable 
solution to the current disparate treatment of developers of new and established 
sites and different types of land use. 
Lessons from Canberra 
In the context of a society in which private ownership of urban land is the 
norm, it is perhaps not surprising that practices more consistent with that norm 
have tended to encroach on Canberra's experiment with public land tenure. 
Examples of this include: the shift from land rents to premiums; the failure to 
charge 100 per cent of betterment for changes in use; the fact that residential land 
leases are effectively in perpetuity; and the fact that leases are very rarely 
terminated by the government. While the reason for the latter may well be in part 
because the government has always withheld sufficient land from development to 
satisfy future public needs, it also reflects the government's unwillingness to play 
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an active role in the redevelopment process. The ironic result of this is that 
leasehold in Canberra is in fact a more secure form of tenure than freehold 
elsewhere in Australia. 
The Canberra experience suggests that it is important to have a clear 
concept of the government's role as a landlord. Accepted principles of public 
asset management require the government to maximise the return from its land 
holdings. Thus we have argued that the ACT Government should charge 100 per 
cent of properly defined betterment and resume its earlier role in the development 
of new suburbs. It must also be kept in mind, however, that the return to be 
maximised is not only financial, nor always even precisely measurable. In a 
misguided effort to reduce costs, the ACT Government has sacrificed good 
planning principles in the development of its new suburb of Palmerston. The 
return to be maximised should be defined instead in terms of the benefit to the 
people of the ACT, in whatever form that might take. Canberra has realised 
many benefits from its system of public land tenure, but its government must 
regain its proper role as public landlord if it is to protect those benefits from 
further erosion. 
The ACT Government has two roles in relation to land: first, it is the land 
owner and manager with a responsibility to its taxpayers to maximise returns 
from its land; and, second, it is the land use planner with a responsibility to 
protect the environment and amenity for all Canberra residents. Sometimes these 
roles are in conflict. The best way to deal with such conflicts is for the role that 
can be specified in business tenns-in this case the land management role-to be 
performed by an authority at arms length from the Government. The Government 
should give a land management authority clear objectives: to maximise profitS 
subject to providing sites for development at premiums comparable to prices 
elsewhere in Australia. It would report publicly to the Government on its 
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achievement of those objectives. Land use planning would remain a direct 
responsibility of the elected government. The relationships between the authority 
and the Government should be open and transparent. There should not be day-
to-day political involvement in its operation. In those circumstances, it would be 
clear when land use decisions were being taken for financial reasons and when 
they were being taken for planning reasons. Two results of such an arrangement 
should be better decisions and greater accountability. 
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Appendix: Algebraic analysis of betterment for change of use 
A change in land use will be profitable when the anticipated value of a 
property,46 including any buildings on the site, after a change in use (V0 ) exceeds 
its value before the change (Vb) plus the costs of demolition (Cd), if any, and new 
construction or rehabilitation ( C ,.), if any. In other terms, a property can be 
profitably put to a new use or redeveloped when: 
[l] 
where the Vs refer to total property value, the Cs to costs, and the subscripts a, b, 
d and n refer to "after'', ''before", "demolition" and ''new", respectively.47 
Under a system of private land tenure, the potential land value associated with a 
permitted reuse or redevelopment is already reflected in the property's current 
market value, Vb. This means that a developer wishing to acquire and develop a 
site must in effect pay much or all of the betterment to the current land owner 
before that owner will release the site. Of course, developers who acquire land 
speculatively in advance of reuse or redevelopment may be able to capture some 
of the betterment themselves. 
Under any leasehold system, the lessee owns only the right to use the 
. property for the purpose designated in the lease. The lessor owns both the right 
to use it for any higher-value use, and the increase in value that would result from 
a change in use. With public land ownership, good asset management requires 
that full betterment should be collected by the government; otherwise, the 
.. The value of a "property" or the value of a "lease" refers to the value of both the site and 
buildings or other improvements. The value of a "site" means the value of the land without 
improvements, but with roads, water, sewerage and other services provided. 
"This discussion is based in part on Heilbrun (1987), pp. 340-344. 
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government is effectively subsidising developers or lessees by allowing them to 
keep increments in land value. 
Betterment under public ownership is the increase in the value of the 
property as a result of permission being given for a new use. The analog to 
inequality [1] above is given as equation [2]: 
B = Vn - (Vp + Cd + Cn). [2] 
Here, the increase in value, B, is simply the total value of the property in its new 
use, Vn, less its value in its previous use, VP, demolition costs, if any, and the 
costs of new construction or alterations.48 Rearranging [2] slightly, we can 
define B in tenns of "before" and "after" values: 
[2'] 
where the bracketed term on the right side of the equation is the after value and 
the second term is the before value. If the term in brackets is defined as Vn', the 
value of the lease in its present condition for the new use--i.e., net of demolition 
and new construction costs but inclusive of any value the existing improvements 
may have in the new ~tterment becomes Vn' - Vp. The general rule is that 
betterment is the increase in the value of the lease in its present condition as a 
result of the permitted change in use. Where demolition is to occur, Vn' = Ln - Cd 
(where Ln is the value of the land in the new use) and betterment is (Ln - Cd) - Vp. 
Where there is no demolition, Vn' = Vn - Cn and betterment is (Vn - Cn) - Vp. 
With public ownership of land, Vp should be lower than Vb because Vp 
does not include a property's potential for redevelopment Because the owner of 
a lease does not own any rights to a change in use, and full betterment should be 
charged by the government when permission is granted for a change in use, VP 
"Note that, in the case of public ownership of land, the subscripts n and p are used (referring 
to "new" and "previous") in lieu of a and b, to emphasise the fact that these values exclude 
any potential and refer only to the value of the property in its approved use. 
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should reflect only the value of the property for its current use. In other words, 
the current leaseholder will be unable to earn any bettennent when the lease is 
transferred because the full value of bettennent is collected by the government. 
The implications of this are as follows: rather than (Ln - Cd) - Vp. the base 
for the charge, because of subclause (a) above, is the larger Ln - Lp. Consider the 
situation that arises when redevelopment from residential to commercial use is 
being considered, where bettennent is charged at the rate of 100 per cent of Ln -
L,,. Unless VP - Lp (=Ip, or the value of improvements in the previous use) and 
the cost of demolition are negligible, which would be true, for example, where an 
existing dwelling had no value for residential purposes, the charge will exceed 
the increase in the value of the lease and no redevelopment will occur. 
Under the current regulations in Canberra, that problem will occur less 
frequently for redevelopment from residential to higher-density residential or 
from commercial to residential, because the bettennent charge is levied at less 
than 100 per cent of the base. The percentage falls with the duration of the 
existing lease, to 50 per cent for leases that have been in existence for 20 or more 
years (as is the case in most areas being considered for redevelopment).49 
The problem can also be seen when a change in use is permitted and 
where the existing building will be used for the new purpose rather than 
demolished, though it may be renovated or altered and additions may be built. If 
a house is to be used for a small business, bettennent is the increase in the value 
of the lease, including existing improvements, for the new use, but before 
meeting the cost of any necessary alterations. The same base is appropriate if the 
change is adding several floors to an office building, or increasing the density of 
•
9 The charge would still prevent redevelopment on a lease of 20 or more years duration that 
would be profitable without it, whenever Lp < 2(Vp + Cd) - L •. 
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building on an industrial site. Since the site is not cleared, it is even more 
obviously wrong to use site value to define the base for the charge. The current 
base for calculation of betterment is L,. - Lp so that precisely the same problems 
arise as in cases involving redevelopment. 
Tables Al and A2 compare hypothetical betterment fees under alternative 
definitions of betterment Table Al assumes that the change of use involves 
complete demolition of existing improvements and redevelopment; Table A2 
assumes that the new use will be accommodated in the existing building with no 
alterations. In both cases, the details are hypothetical and intended only to be 
illustrative. The most remarkable point to be drawn from Table Al 
(redevelopment) is that the current regulations (Rule 3) can result in betterment 
charges that are substantially higher than the correct ones (Rule 1 ); this would 
make any redevelopment unprofitable when the charge is at the rate of 100 per 
cent of betterment. Rule 2, on the other hand, subsidises developers and lessees. 
In Table A2 (no redevelopment), Rules 2 and 3 are both shown to subsidise 
developers and lessees. 
1 H ·ca1 be Table A • typo theta tterment ea cu ate d d b f .bd un er a ternatave ru es: c an2e o use wit 
Rule Betterment rules H before values Hvnnthetical after values 
number (Anal01tous ACT methods)<•> Land + lmnrovements =Total Land - Demolition costs =Total 
1 Before value: Land and improvements 4 +I, =V, L. -c. =V,..' 
assuming no variation. After value: 
Land minus demolition costs.<c> 100,000 150,000 250,000 500,000 7,500 492,500 
500,000 750,000 1,250,000 1,500,000 37,500 1,462,500 
(Method A) 
2 Before value: Land only including risk- 4 +O =4 L. -0 =L.. 
adjusted potential.<•> After value: Land 
only. 450,000 n/a 450,000 500,000 n/a 500,000 
1,350,000 n/a 1,350,000 1,500,000 n/a 1,500,000 
(Methods B and C) 
3 Before value: Land only assuming no 4 +O =4 L. -0 =L.. 
variation. After value: Land only. 
100,000 n/a 100,000 500,000 n/a 500,000 
(MethodD) 500,000 n/a 500,000 1,500,000 n/a 1,500,000 
Notes: 
(a) See Table 2. Note that the calculation of fees under the analogous methods usually involved partial remission of bettermenL 
(b) The calculations are based on the assumption that Rule 1 is die correct one. 
r . emo 1taon an d d re eve ooment 
Per cent of true 
Betterment bellenllent1'> 
=V.'-V, = 100 by definition 
242,500 100 
212,500 100 
=L.-4 = (L. - 4)/(V.' - V,) 
50,000 21 
150,000 71 
=L.-4 = (L. - 4)/(V.' - V,) 
400,000 165 
1,000,000 453 
(c) To simplify the calculation, it is assumed that existing improvements have no value for the new use. The cost of demolition, c,, is assumed to be 5% of the before value of 
improvements. 
(d) Land value including risk-adjusted potential, 4. is assumed to be 90% of land value after the lease variation is granted,£... 
Table A2. Hypothetical betterment calculated under alternative rules: change of use with no demolition or 
r ed 1 t eveopmen 
Rule Betterment rules H before values Hvnnthetical after values 
number (Ana!Ol!OUS ACT methods)<•> Land + Improvements =Total Land + Imnmvements =Total 
1 Before value: Land and improvements 4 +I, = V, L.. +I. =V,.' 
11SSU111ing no variation. After value: 
Land and pre-existing improvements.(c> 100,000 150,000 250,000 500,000 250,000 750,000 
500,000 750,000 1,250,000 1,500,000 1,250,000 2,750,000 
(Method A) 
2 Before value: Land only including risk- 4 +O =4 L.. +O =L.. 
adjusted potential. (d) Afttt value: Land 
only. 450,000 n/a 450,000 500,000 n/a 500,000 
1,350,000 n/a 1,350,000 1,500,000 n/a 1,500,000 
(Methods B and C) 
3 Before value: Land only assuming no 4 +O =4 L. +O =L. 
variation. Afttt value: Land only. 
100,000 n/a 100,000 500,000 n/a 500,000 
(MethodD) 500,000 n/a 500,000 1,500,000 n/a 1,500,000 
Notes: 
(a) See Table 2. Note that the calculation of fees under the analogous methods usually involved partial remission of bettermenl 
(b) The calculations are based on the assumption that Rule 1 is the correct one. 
Per cent of true 
Bettennent bettennent<"> 
=V.'-V, = 100 by definition 
500,000 100 
1,500,000 100 
=L. - 4 = (4. - 4)/(V.' - V,) 
50,000 10 
150,000 10 
=L.-4 = (4. - 4)/(V.' - V.) 
400,000 80 
1,000,000 67 
( c) To simplify the calculations, it is assumed that the after value of improvements (/.) includes only the value of pre-existing improvements for the new use. 
( d) Land value including risk-adjusted potential, L,,, is assumed to be 90% of land value after the lease variation is granted, L... 
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